Australian Left Review No.126 1991 by Aarons, Brian
3 0009 02914 4735
F T R E V I E W r
THE GREAT GULF DEBA
GORBACHEV’S RIGHT TURN 
CHILD ABUSE 
WOMEN AND AIDS 
OZ SHAKESPEARE
HEALTH WARS
'  » 1 % V
N , ,  ♦*», " N i 7  >  T *+> •
-r -* j w  H »  > 5  S
^2Sr N  <  > £ > 2 '
*’''*•» ^*7 <*, Vi. ' K  '-*> t,. J‘
iy't* J>. S „ H  ^
i' v  ” /»» »*
i----------------------------------------------------------- - — ------------1
I w o u l d  l i k e  to s u b s a i b e  I d  Ed i t i on s  R e v i e w  a n d  e nc l os e  S I 6  f o r  six  i ssues ( w i t h i n  A u s t r a l i a ]
N a m e :
A dd r e s s :
F r o m  c u r r e n t  i s s u e / p l e a s e  s t a r t  w i t h  i ssue:
B O O K  R E V I E W S ,  
D E B A T E  A N D  
C O M M E N T  ON  
A U S T R A L I A N  & 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
L I T E R A T U R E S  
B Y  S O M E  OF  
A U S T R A L I A ' S  
B E S T  W R I T E R S
Post  to E D I T I O N S  RE VI EW PO Box 1 5 5 8  Pot t s  P o i n t  N SW  2 0 1 1  or  F a x  to  0 !  3 3 1  4 0 7 3 til MAR II
M A R C H / A P R I L
I S S U E
AVAIlABli NOW 
featuring 
European 
l iterature , 
teaching writing, 
strange SI 
and much more
CAUSE WITHOUT EFFECT: The Gulf crisis has revealed the poverty of 
oppositionalism on the Left, argues Colin Mercer.
WAR OF PRINCIPLES: Missed the debate on the Gulf War? What debate, you 
ask? Here ALR presents a range o f points o f view.
ABUSED AND ABANDONED: Satanic child abuse is a hidden epidemic - hidden 
because few will believe it. Yvonne Preston reports.
GOODBYE TO THE SWEDISH MODEL: Andrew Vandenberg and G eo ff D ow  
on the new austerity in the bastion of social democracy.
SOVEREIGN DESIRES: What would Aboriginal self-rule actually mean? Garth
EDITORIAL COLLECTIVES - SYDNEY: Brian Aaron*, Eric Aarons, Hilda Andrew*, R o b  Bragg, David BurchelX dare Curran. Kitty Eggerking,
Jfcn Endcnby, Gloria Gaiton, Jane Inglis, Sue McCicadk, Peter McNIk e , Mike Tidier. MELBOURNE: Louise Connor, Jim Crosthwaile, David Eltershank, 
Kale Kennedy, Pavla MiHet Ken Nor ling, Olga Silver. BRISBANE: Nicola Doumany, Jane Evans, Howard Guille, Mike Kennedy, Co bn Menxt, Mkhael
CORRESPONDENCE: ALR, PO Box A247, Sydney South 2000. PHONE: (02) 2S1 7668; (02) 281 2899. (A X  (02) 281 2897.
ALR welcome* contribution* and letter*. Contributions must be typed, double-spaced on one side of the paper only. They will be returned if 
accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. A style guide is available on request. Arrangements for electronic transmission of article*
AUSTRALIAN LEFT R E V IE W : 126 M A R C H  1991
Meadows, Jeffery Mirucn, Rob McQueen, Paul Norton, Marg O'Donnell, Giselle Thomas, Tony Wbodyalt.
MANAGING EDITOR: David BurcheU. PRODUCTION EDITOR: Kitty Eggerking 
ADVERTISING: Ros Bragg. ACCOUNTS: Hilda Andrews (Sydney); Olga Silver (Melbourne). 
DISTRIBUTION: Intvnews, 1 Seddon Street, Bankstown, NSW 2200 
DESIGN: Jim Endenby. COVER GRAPHIC: Jim Endersby 
TYPESETTING Gloria Garton. PRINTER: Spotpress, 105-107 Victoria Road, Manickville 2204. 
PUBLISHED BY; Australian Radical Publications, 635 Ham* St, Ultimo 2007.
All material CALR 1991. Permission must be sought to reprint articles or reproduce graphics.
either on disc or by modem - can be made. Ring the ALR office for information.
Views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the editorial collective.
2 COLUMNS
Is Peace Enough?
The debate on theCulfW arhasso 
far been characterised by a high 
degree of certainty and se lf­
righteousness on all sides. Both 
pro- and anti-war campaigners 
seem sure that they have the 
'solution' to the crisis. For those 
on the extra-parliamentary Left, 
who form the bulk of the active 
anti-war protestors, recent history 
suggests that they of all people 
should be wary of trying to appear 
omniscient. If they learned only 
one thing from the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, it 
should surely have been that the 
Left does not have all the answers 
to the world's problems.
The anti-war protestors' insistence 
that they are acting strictly accord­
ing to the highest principles is 
dubious. While the US is rightly 
lambasted for its cynicism in sup­
porting Saddam during the Iran- 
Iraq war, few on the Left have seen 
fi t to cri tidse the br ut a), reaction ary 
and undemocratic regimes which 
dominate the Arab world. Nor 
have the anti-war campaigners 
done much more than pay lip-ser­
vice to the idea that Iraq is the prin­
cipal aggressor in the war. Where 
have been the protests outside the 
Iraqi consulate?
That the protests have so far con­
centrated on 'US imperialism' is 
not a surprise. There certainly is a 
compelling case to be made against 
American policy in the Gulf. How­
ever, it is the knee-jerk reaction 
againstlsrael which snows how lit­
tle thought has gone into the politi­
cal objectives of the demonstra­
tions. Of course, the Gulf War is 
'linked' to the Palestinian issue, be­
cause the West's glaring double 
standards on UN resolutions con­
demning Israel have given Saddam 
the opportunity to present himself 
as the avenger of the Palestinians.
What, however, is the message of 
an 'anti-war' protest outside the Is­
raeli consulate in Sydney? At a time 
when Israel's only direct part in the 
war has been to suffer repeated at­
tacks from Iraqi missiles, the only 
conclusion one could draw is that 
the protestors deny Israel's right to 
respond to such attacks. This is tan­
tamount to denying Israel's right to 
exist, something which even the 
PLO has until recently conceded.
This is an attitude warped by years 
of commitment - and commen­
dable commitment - to the cause of 
the Palestinians. Support for the 
ANC, the PLO and the Sandinistas 
has become the litmus test of Left 
credibility in the same way that 
defending Stalin was in the 1930s, 
and the result has been a similar 
ossification of Left positions.
When the true nature of Stalinism 
and then Brezhnevism became ap­
parent to everyone, most left-wing 
groups in the West quietly forgot 
about Eastern Europe, or tried 
somewhat sheepishly to point to 
the supposed 'achievements' of 
East Germany or Czechoslovakia. 
The same tunnel vision and lack of 
self-criticism  are evident in a 
response to the Gulf which is 
capable of dismissing or ignoring 
the atrocities committed against 
their own people by the govern­
ments of Syria, Iraq and others.
In truth, it's only for genuine 
pacifists that the Gulf issue is clear- 
cut. Most of the anti-war protestors 
are not pacifists, however While 
they are revolted by what war 
means, and rightly sceptical of the 
benefits of pursuing this one, few 
would deny the right of the ANC, 
or other guerrilla groups to armed 
struggle. This majority of non­
pacifists has largely failed to come 
up with any response to the war
beyond 'US Out of the Gulf' and 
'Bring The Frigates Home'.
It's not clear who, if anyone, would 
be left to pursue the alternative, 
'peaceful' policy of enforcing sanc­
tions on Iraq, if these demands 
were to be unexpectedly met. In 
effect such a position implies that 
in future the world wiil simply 
have to accept actions like the in­
vasion of Kuwait, because war and 
'US im perialism ' are always 
greater evils.
Nor is it good enough simply to 
point to the mistakes made before
2 August, It is certainly true that the 
war is the immediate result of spec­
tacular foreign policy failures on 
the part of the West. Nevertheless, 
crises such as this are bound to 
occur again. And withdrawal by 
the US from its current position of 
power over many parts of the 
world would not necessarily make 
regional conflicts any less likely.
Thfcre is a dire need tor a more 
sophisticated approach to interna­
tional tensions, and an escape from 
the crude politics of opposition. 
Where, to take one example, is any 
new analysis from the Left of the 
way in which the UN should inter­
vene in future disputes? The shrill 
cry of 'Bring The Frigates Home' 
suggests not only an unwillingness 
to address the unpleasant nitty- 
gritty issue of how to get Saddam 
out of Kuwait, but also an 
isolationism which denies that 
Australia should have any engage­
ment wit h the rest of the world, UN 
resolutions notwithstanding.
The demonstrations against the 
war are honourable and, I per­
sonally believe, right in seeing war 
as an unacceptable solution, or no 
solution at all to the present crisis. 
But if the political ideas behind 
them remain naive and com­
placent, the Left is condemning it­
self to remain on the outer fringes 
of Australian politics for the 
foreseeable future.
MIKE TICHER is a member of ALR'a 
editorial collective.
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PROFILE
President 
Ali-Akbar 
Rafsanjani
Among Iran's ruling mullahs Presi­
dent Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani is con­
sidered a m oderate and a 
pragmatist, and, so long as the 
moderates hold the balance of 
power, Iran, say the experts, will 
remain neutral in the present Gulf 
crisis. Indeed, they say that Iran's 
declaration of neutrality—together 
with its offer to negotiate a settle­
ment on behalf of the coalition 
with Iraq—is evidence o f the 
moderates' consolidation of power.
UN Secretary-General Javier Perez 
de Cuellar certainly welcomed 
Rafsanjani's offer of 4 February to 
mediate. "I think Iran is in a good 
position to produce a formula which 
could put an end to the present 
situation," he said. The media 
generally reported that Washington 
was less than impressed with the 
initiative. It is an understatement to 
say that the US is still deeply suspi­
cious of Iran: it hasn't, and probably 
can't, forgive Iran for the US hostage 
crisis of 1979-80,
News that 100 Ir.iqi planes- had fled 
to Iran broke within 24 hours of 
Rafsanjani's mediation offer. This 
event seemed to confirm  US 
suspicion of Iran's duplicity. Time 
suggested that Iran and Iraq had ar- 
■anged the "migration" of the planes 
well in advance at a meeting in Teh­
ran on 8 January, a claim denied by
Iran, which added that the planes 
had been impounded for the dura­
tion of the war. Time was clearly 
unimpressed by such assertions and 
went on to suggest: "By helping out 
Saddam, Rafsanjani is assuaging the 
feelings of radical Islamic factions 
with ban's parliament, who are un­
happy to see Iran ignore the ptim- 
m eling of fellow Muslims by 
Western forces."
It is true that the radicals, or the 
more fundamentalist elements of 
the parliament, are far more en­
thusiastic than the moderates about 
promoting Islamic universatism, 
but nobody in Iran appears—not­
withstanding unconfirmed reports 
that some revolutionary guards 
fired off missiles in the direction of
Saudi Arabia—prepared to go to 
war. And experts have dismissed 
Rafsanjani's pledge committing Iran 
to the Gulf war in the event of 
Israel's active involvement as mere 
rhetoric. Iran is still hurting badly 
from its eight year war with Iraq: 
unemployment is high, the 
economy is shattered and Iran has a 
much depleted arsenal and its 
people want to get on with the busi­
ness of reconstruction as soon as 
possible.
After the death of the radical Ayatol­
lah Khomeini in mid-1989, 80% of 
the Assembly of Experts, some 70 
religious leaders whose task it is to 
appoint Iran's president, voted for 
the moderate Rafsanjani to lead the 
country. While their interpretion 
and stances on issues may have dif­
fered, their fundamental vision of 
the Islam ic Republic of Iran
remained the same. Rafsanjani, a 
trusted supporter of the Ayatollah 
since his student days, fared very 
well under the Ayatollah: soon after 
the revolution he was appointed to 
the Ayatollah's secret Revolutionary 
Council, after the overthrow of 
President Bani-Sadr he became one 
of the Presidential Council trium­
virate and later speaker of the Maj- 
les, the Iranian parliament. Since 
coming to power, Rafsanjani has 
pursued policies of his own, mostly 
with the general support of the Mai- 
les. He rescinded the Ayatollah's call 
for the death of Salman Rushdie, 
only to reinstate the threat following 
objections by the radicals.
While it is possible to specify the 
major policy differences between 
the radicals and the moderates, it is 
not easy to quantify the strengths of 
either camp, since factional a IB ancts 
remain highly fluid, reforming 
around single issues.
In economic matters, because of 
their close association with the mid­
dle classes, the moderates favour a 
dominant private sector, foreign 
financing or the reconstruction, and 
limited land reforms. They place 
more emphasis on the profes­
sionalism of personnel, rather than 
the ideological purity demanded by 
the radicals. It is their policy too to 
seek rapprochement with the West 
and to allow a relaxation of the 
moral code. By contrast the radicals 
prefer a state-run economy, limited 
use of foreign finance and 
widespread land reform. They 
would seek to extend the domain of 
Islam and to enforce a strict moral 
code.
None of this is to suggest that Iran 
has suddenly become a paragon of 
liberal democracy; rather it is to sug­
gest Rafsanjani's willingness to re- 
involve Iran in world affairs and to 
re-establish a dialogue with the 
United States. It is to suggest also 
tnat for the moment Iran's leaders 
share a common desire for peace and 
neutrality. It is not in Iran's interests 
to enter the war. If anything, the 
status of Iran and Israel, as the two 
non-Arab states in the Middle East, 
will be enhanced as a result of the 
war, since deep and long-lasting 
rifts among the Arab nations are in­
evitable afterwards.
Kitty Eggerking
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Bye Bye Gorby
It was in November 1990 that Gorbachev took his 
wrong turn and ceased to be a major progressive 
historical force. This does not by any means deny the 
significance of what he has achieved so far; indeed, 
it would probably be too much to expect any 
individual to go further than he has. There is a limit 
to what individuals can achieve— even if they are 
Nobel Laureates.
The logic of Gorbachev's position re­
quired him to work with the existing 
forces in an attempt to achieve consen­
sus. The need to make compromises 
with the conservative forces always 
carried with it the risk of being cap­
tured by them. Gorbachev is to be con­
gratulated for pushing the old-style 
conservatives as far as he did. But ul­
timately there was always a limit to 
how far the conservative forces would 
go, especially  when they were 
renewed by younger forces. It was 
clear that, at some point, Gorbachev 
was going to have to make a choice.
Many people, possibly including Gor­
bachev, had underestimated the 
political sense of Boris Yeltsin, leader 
of the democrats. They thought 
Yeltsin a demagogue who could only 
succeed in opposition. When Yeltsin 
was elected chairperson of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian 
Republic last May, many thought he 
would expose himself as the charlatan 
they had always felt him to be. They 
argued that he would never be able to 
develop positive policies and would 
soon be rejected by his disillusioned 
followers.
That has not happened. Yeltsin has 
grown in stature. And he is offering an 
alternative model of state power that 
more and more thinkers are finding 
attractive: a confederation of 
sovereign republics which only cede 
to the centre those powers which they 
voluntarily wish to cede.
Many top Gorbachev advisers have 
gone over to Yeltsin's camp—where 
they feel that their advice will be heard 
and acted upon. These include the 
leading agricultural economist and
president of the co-operative move­
ment, V Tikhonov, and the leading 
economist and economic reformer 
Shatalin. Many other leading 
democrats are in the process of going 
over to Yeltsin—this may include 
Alexander Yakovlev and possibly 
even Edvard Shevardnadze.
Gorbachev's sharp turn to the Right 
was probably greatly influenced by 
the recognition of the success of 
Yeltsin and the realisation that Yeltsin 
was becoming an increasingly viable 
threat to Gorbachev's power. It looked 
last October as if Gorbachev would be 
prepared to throw in his lot with the 
dem ocrats and take a mainly 
cerem onial or diplomatic role 
equivalent to the Queen of the Com­
monwealth. But, ultimately, the 
thought of being queen of a common­
wealth dominated by Yeltsin seems to 
have been too much for Gorbachev 
and he appears to have decided to 
defend the powers of the centre at all 
costs.
Personal factors were certainly not the 
only ones behind Gorbachev's 
decision. Other considerations in­
cluded the increasingly conservative 
orientation of the economy and the 
difficulties in launching real econo mic 
reforms, growing concern over in­
creased ethnic unrest, increased pres­
sure from the army leadership and 
other elite groups and general concern 
about the growth in crime and disor­
der.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the 
body through which Gorbachev legal­
ly exercises his power. This All-Union 
parliament is considerably more con­
servative than the separate republican
parliaments, especially that of the 
largest—Russian—republic headed 
by Yeltsin. The reasons for this dif­
ference are fairly dear. The depu ties of 
the Congress of Peoples Deputies, 
who ultim ately elect the Union 
Supreme Soviet, were elected earlier 
than their republican counterparts, at 
a time when the general atmosphere 
in the country was less radical. A third 
of their number were also made up of 
unelected representatives of various 
social organisations which were 
selected at a time when the Com­
munist Party was the only legal party. 
Finally, there has been a systematic 
boycotting of this assembly by the 
radical Baltic representatives; this is a 
move which strengthens the more 
conservative forces. For all these 
reasons, conservative forces in the All­
Union parliament are particularly 
strong. Recently these conservative 
forces have combined in the Soyuz or 
'Union' group which has been placing 
considerable pressure on Gorbachev 
through the threatening statements of 
its major spokesperson. Colonel Vic­
tor Alksniss.
The economic situation is also very 
disturbing. The latest official Soviet 
statistics indicate that in 1990 national 
income fell by 4%, labour productivity 
by 3% and exports by 12%. The grow­
ing budget deficit had been covered 
by printing money, creating a crisis 
which has finally been tackled by the 
draconian and highly unpopular act 
of withdrawing 50 and 100 rouble 
notes. While the reformers argue that 
this disastrous collapse of the 
economy is a consequence of the old 
administrative style of running the 
economy, the conservatives and 
centralists argue (with some justice) 
that part of the disruption is a result of 
the transition process itself.
The scale of ethnic unrest has horrified 
many; especially horrible have been 
the bloody disputes between Azer­
baijanians and Armenians, the Geor­
gians and Ossetians, and the 
M oldavians and Gaugaze. The 
centralists and conservatives explain 
this in terms of a general decline in law 
and order, while the democrats often
blame local conservative interests 
who wish to threaten the reforms, and 
insensitive policing.
The situation in the Baltic states is 
somewhat different, since here the 
ethnic strivings have so far taken on a 
more political, and less anarchistic 
*nd violent, form. Yeltsin has consis­
tently moved to defuse the ethnic con­
flict here. Immediately after his 
election he broke Gorbachev's block­
ade of Lithuania by negotiating a 
trade treaty between the Lithuanian 
Republic and the Russian Republic. 
More recently he has extended the 
trade treaty to cover political matters 
and has negotiated certain rights for 
Russian ethnics in Lithuania. How­
ever, he does recommend that they 
learn Lithuanian.
The position of the army, where there 
are many different groupings, is very 
complex. Many regular military 
leaders seem to be deeply disturbed 
by the use of troops for policing ac­
tivities. They had been highly critical 
of the use of troops in Tbilisi and Baku, 
even before the recent action in Vil­
nius and Riga, and they believe that 
the army should stay out of politics.
The large number of military deputies 
in the political system naturally have 
a different attitude. These are the in­
dividuals who make up the backbone 
of the Soyuz group and it was follow­
ing Gorbachev's stormy five-hour 
meeting with military deputies last 
November that Gorbachev took his
first major steps to the Right. Gor­
bachev reorganised the government 
and authorised the military to fire on 
civilians if threatened. The liberal 
Minister of the Interior, VBaka tin, was 
sacked and replaced with hardliners B 
Pugo and General Gromov. Several 
highly disciplined divisions of 
paratroops and KGB forces were 
transferred to Gromov's control in the 
Ministry of the Interior. And joint 
m ilitary / police patrols were 
authorised in the cities. It was these 
and sim ilar moves which led 
Shevardnadze to resign and warn of 
the threat to democracy.
However, G orbachev's collapse 
before the military hardliners is not 
complete, and, much to the disgust of 
the centralists, Gorbachev has failed 
to endorse their use of violence in the 
Baltic. Alksniss predictably described 
Gorbachev as indecisive and called for 
his removal.
The balance between the military con­
servatives—who wish to engage ac­
tively in politics—and the military 
democrats—who wish to stay out—is 
unclear. Gorbachev's position is driv­
ing him reluctantly toward the former, 
while Yeltsin is appealing desperately 
to the latter.
Finally, the law and order issue has 
now become the chief policy plank ot 
the centre. It has been the ultimate 
justification for the military involve­
ment in the Baltic, for the military 
patrols in Moscow and other cities,
and for increased KGB powers to in­
spect the accounts of private busi­
nesses. The political struggle in the 
Baltic and the entrepreneurial pursuit 
of profit are both interpreted by Gor­
bachev and his new allies as disobey­
ing Union legislation and as breaking 
the law. Yeltsin, however, sees it dif­
ferently: he accepts Lithuanian inde­
pendence and has already passed 
radical free enterprise legislation in 
the Russian Republican parliament.
While a case can be made that Gor­
bachev is still simply engaged in 
making necessary compromises with 
conservative forces, the reasoning for 
such a case looks more and more 
strained. The problem is that the for­
ces around Gorbachev are becoming 
increasingly conservative—and it ap­
pears Gorbachev is becoming increas­
ingly reliant upon them. More and 
more of his progressive advisers are 
coming to the conclusion that the fu­
ture of democracy in the country 
would be best served by a clear break 
with the conservative forces at the 
centre. Unfortunately Gorbachev ap­
pears to be resolved to defend the 
Union at all costs. It is for this reason 
that more and more people are con­
cluding that Gorbachev's progressive 
historic role is finally coming to an 
end.
STEPHEN WHEATCROFT it head of the 
Soviet Studies Centre at Melbourne 
University.
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Mikhail's Baltic Rubicon
Justus Poleckis is a member of the Lithuanian 
parliament and a founding member of the liberal 
Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania. He was 
elected in February 1990, one month before 
Lithuania declared its independence. As deputy 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he 
visited Berlin shortly after the Soviet Army's 
mid-January assault on the Lithuanian television 
station in Vilnius, which left 15 people dead. He was 
interviewed by Paul Hockenos in February.
Things seem to have quieted down 
in Lithuania. How would you 
describe the mood there, some 
three weeks after the bloodshed? 
In Vilnius the situation is still very 
tense. Although they live with this 
fearand insecurity, the mood isn't pes­
simistic. The recent events have 
radicalised the people. Whereas 
before there was a good deal of 
criticism of the [Lithuanian] govern­
ment and parliament, now both have 
unprecedented support across the 
political spectrum.
Before the army's intervention, there 
were two conflicting positions within 
parliament over the best course to 
achieve independence. One camp ad­
vocated a step-by-step approach to 
breaking away from the Soviet Union. 
Another group backed a much faster, 
radical track. The second approach is 
now much more popular. After the 
bloodshed, the people want to leave 
the Soviet Union with as little delay as 
possible.
That's understandable. But is that 
plausible within the context of the 
present political scenario in the 
Soviet Union?
Perhaps when Gorbachev was much 
stronger, he might have been in a posi­
tion to give the Baltics their freedom. 
Now, it's clear, he's completely in­
capable of this. Nevertheless, on prin­
ciple we object to the slower route to 
independence. The people's patience 
is at an end.
Some critics argue that the rejec­
tion of the step-by-step approach 
has only bolstered reactionaiy for­
ces, in effect setting back the inde­
pendence drive. Tactically, is full- 
speed-ahead the best policy?
It's debatable. But the Germans didn't 
wait years to dismantle the wall piece 
by piece. Lithuania isn't a power like 
Germany, nor do we have oi 1 fi elds like 
Kuwait, and therefore we receive no 
great support from the West. We, how­
ever, have a right to independence, 
and how flexibly we pursue that goal 
will be a critical issue.
Whatever our course, we were bound 
to run into resistance from conserva­
tive comers. Latvia and Estonia, for 
example, have followed a less radical 
independence policy, yet their situa­
tion is not less precarious than ours.
The treatment of the Polish and 
Russian minorities in Lithuania 
over the last year was used as one 
justification for the army's inter­
vention. How do you see this7 
Where do the minorities stand7
It's a fact that the Russians especially 
were unhappy with some of the new 
measures that parliament had passed. 
But since the violence erupted, it is 
clear that the overwhelming majority 
of both Poles and Russians have 
thrown their support behind the inde­
pendence movement. Last week I 
spoke with some Russian engineers 
and technicians at a Vilnius factory. 
They said that nobody, regardless of 
nationality, could in good conscience 
condone the army's bloody interven­
tion. They said that Russian lives 
would also be lost—although in Vil­
nius only Lithuanians were killed. 
However, they tend to back the more 
cautious path to full independence.
Is there any basis to charges of dis­
crimination and human rights 
violations against the minorities? 
Have Lithuanian nationalistic 
m easures fu elled  animosity 
among the minorities?
Mistakes were made, although these 
shouldn't be exaggerated either. 
Naturally, the new expression of 
Lithua nian national ism was felt by the 
Russians. For the Lithuanians, it was 
in part a reaction to 50 years of Russian 
domination over and oppression of 
the Lithuanian people. Many Rus­
sians were bitter about losing their 
privileged positions.
At the same time, the government also 
erred in its insensitivity toward the 
non-Lithuanian peoples. The legisla­
tion that made Lithuanian the 
republic's official language, for ex­
ample, was unrealistic and perhaps 
too nationalistic. All Poles and Rus­
sians were to learn Lithuanian within 
2-3 years. Less than half of the 
minorities can speak Lithuanian. For 
the older generations in particular, 
this as an im possible demand. 
Secondly, there were also too few 
radio and TV programs in other lan­
guages. The opponents of inde­
pendence concentrated effectively on 
this grievance. Lastly, there was far 
too little preparation work done to 
assist the minorities, including the 
Russian military personnel stationed 
here, with the transition.
In the week preceding the army's 
assault there were surprisingly big 
demonstrations, consisting mostly 
of Russians, against government- 
backed price rises. Were the 
protests manipulated?
The dem onstrations were spon­
taneous, but it was difficult to provoke 
the Poles or the Russians onto the 
streets. The economic measures were 
poorly prepared and Lithuanians, too, 
were angry. The protests were indeed 
manipulated by the conservative for­
ces that stood behind them.
Both in Latvia and Lithuania the 
conservative forces that oppose in­
dependence consolidated them­
ALR . MARCH 199)
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selves within organisations under 
the name 'The Committee to Save 
the Nation" [CSN]. It was the CSN 
in both republics thatcalled for the 
army's intervention. How much 
support do these groups have? 
Who comprises their member­
ship?
At the moment, it's unclear exactly 
who's in their ranks. In Latvia, it's been 
officially made known that the secretary 
of the Moscow-loyal Latvian Com­
munis! Party is in the Latvian group's 
leadership. In Lithuania, the organisa­
tion included 15 or 16 Russian and some 
Polish groups that were critical of the 
Lithuanian government and parlia­
ment. But since the intervention, almost 
att of those groups have distanced 
themselves from it, strongly condemn­
ing both the organisation and the inter­
vention. Only a handful of very 
conservative, Moscow-oriented ele­
ments remain within it.
When you say that the Vilnius 
events have "radicalised* the 
Lithuanian population, can one as­
sume that this also means a surge 
in nationalist sympathies? How 
would you describe the republic's 
nationalist parties? What is their 
relation to democracy?
It appears that radical nationalist 
groups, such as the League for 
Lithuanian Freedom, whose support 
had been very limited, now enjoy 
much greater backing. I would 
describe these organisations as Right- 
oriented, authoritarian and extremely 
nationalistic.
While almost all political forces are 
now united behind the fastest possible 
exit from the Soviet Union, there are 
some that would sacrifice the process 
of democratisation for immediate in­
dependence. Others, such as myself, 
favour pursuing both goals simul­
taneously, even under these very dif­
ficult conditions. The policies that 
affect minorities, for example, must be 
re-evaluated and the minorities better 
incorporated into the political 
process.
One gets the impression that the 
army was not entirely united on 
the action in Vilnius. Is there a 
conflict between the army person­
nel in the Baltics and the central 
high command?
I'm  not an expert on the Soviet 
military, but there is no doubt that 
deep divisions exist within the armed 
forces. One thing is clear, the soldiers 
stationed in Lithuania would not 
open fire on demonstrators. Special 
non-Lithuanian units were brought in 
for the job.
This, then, would lend credence to 
the charge that the command came 
from above, perhaps from Gor­
bachev himself...
Yes, my feeling is that general arran­
gements were okayed by Gorbachev. 
He gave the army the go-ahead for 
definite action, although without 
specific details. I'm afraid that some 
very inaccurate information found its 
way to Moscow, information that con­
ditions were ripe for a putsch. I think 
that this information was planted by 
reactionary forces intent on pushing 
through a harder line at any price.
Gorbachev's role in the military 
action, as well as other recent 
events have cast serious doubts 
over the Soviet leader's ability to 
carry out political and economic 
reform. Is the reform process at an 
end?
The chance for real democratic reform 
is now extremely slim. Two years ago 
I was very optimistic. Today I believe 
that only a m iracle can save 
democracy and perestroika.
The only chance is for Gorbachev to 
make a decisive shift toward 
democratic reform, that is, toward 
people like Boris Yeltsin. That, of 
course, is easier said than done under 
the present conditions. The conserva­
tives in Moscow can act even more 
ruthlessly than they have, and will 
certainly do so if Gorbachev takes that 
course.
Do you mean a military putsch?
The possibility is very real.
But is this "reform camp' a feasible 
alternative? Can they push through 
democratic changes without sparking 
civil war, economic chaos and ethnic 
conflict?
Hardly. I don't want to be overly pes­
simistic, but there would have to be 
very favourable conditions for them 
to pull it off. The leaders would have
to be very astute, the economic situa­
tion must stabilise, the republics 
would have to act much more 
reasonably and there would also have 
to be strong support from the West. All 
of these factors must be present.
What are the next steps for the Bal­
tics?
Negotiations with Moscow are the 
key now. We'll have to see if the 
central government is still functioning 
and if it is in a position to make con­
cessions. If not, we'll have to wait and 
see how things develop in Moscow. 
Western assistance— diplomatic 
recognition, admission into interna­
tional organisations, and so on—is 
also crucial. Of course, economic aid 
is also necessary although I'm not sure 
how realistic that is now.
There is still a lot of sympathy for 
Gorbachev in the West, especially in 
Germany Germany, above all, should 
not forget that it was the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact which authorised the Soviet an­
nexation of the Baltic states in 1939. 
That was the onset of our recent tragic 
history.
There will be a popular referen­
dum in March on a new union
treaty that would open the door to
full independence.
That is a Moscow-backed all-Soviet 
Union opinion poll which would only 
spell the terms for a new confedera­
tion between the republics. We are not 
voluntarily part of the Soviet Union 
and we will decide our status in our 
own way. Lithuania's own referen­
dum in February dealt with another 
question entirely—whether the 
majority agreed to a fully inde­
pendent and democratic Lithuanian 
state. Almost 90% of the voters backed 
it. That number wouldn't have been so 
high a few weeks ago.
What now?
Moscow won't be happy with this 
result, but it will be a factor abroad, 
proof of the consensus in Lithuania. It 
will also rally more support for the 
Baltics from the democratic forces in 
the bigger republics. Now those forces 
are our only hope.
PAUL HOCKENOS is a freelance 
journalist based in Budapest.
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The 500 or so Australian women known to be HIV 
positive are the forgotten sufferers in the Aids 
tragedy. Unlike many gay men. the women have 
lacked the support of a cohesive, sympathetic and 
organised community. Frequently they have felt 
alienated, isolated and stigmatised by erroneous 
labels.
"Women with the virus are still 
thought to be IV drug users or pros­
titutes," said Sarah, a Melbourne 
spokesperson for Positive Women, a 
support group based in several cities. 
"In fact the women come from in­
credibly diverse backgrounds."
The very diversity of class, back­
ground and education is another 
obstacle for the women to overcome. 
Vet the disease has often proved a 
leveller when women finally come 
together. The suburban housewife 
who has never used drugs or cheated 
on her husband can find a friend in a 
heroin user.
"It doesn't seem to matter how they 
became infected; the fact they are in­
fected is what matters," said Amelia 
Tyler, HIV support officer at the NSW 
Aids Council.
A lot of women, terrified for their 
children's well-being, talk to no one 
but a telephone counsellor or doctor 
about their predicament. They cannot 
tell their children, immediate family 
or closest friends, and they won't at­
tend support meetings lest their secret 
is revealed. Motivated to protect their 
children from possible persecution at 
school, the women's understandable 
behaviour often serves to isolate them 
further.
The failure of many general prac­
titioners to diagnose the vims correct­
ly in women is a serious problem. Like 
many in the community, some doctors 
are blinded by preconceptions of 
"Aids victim s". Ms Average can 
present with rampant thrush, nausea, 
pains in her arms and legs, continual 
headaches and lethargy, and swollen 
glands but never be treated for the
virus as such symptoms would indi­
cate.
"She is treated as just a tired, stressed- 
out woman," said Amelia Tyler.
A lot of women are not correctly diag­
nosed until they present with oppor­
tunistic infections such as meningitis ' 
or pneumocystis carinii pneumonia 
when their immune system is so 
depleted it is hard for them to build 
themselves up again.
Diagnosed at an earlier stage, people 
with HIV can be offered a range of 
m edicines to help prevent 
pneumonia, herpes and thrush. Some 
evidence also suggests that the earlier 
the drug AZT is taken the better.
A survey by the WA Aids Council also 
highlighted the lack of sensitivity 
Aids organisations and other health 
care agencies have shown to women 
with HIV.
With gay men predominant among 
the infected, the sick and the dying, it 
was perhaps not surprising that coun­
sellors and doctors were frequently at 
sea when they encountered a woman 
with the virus.
The report said it was important that 
the Aids Councils, who had the most 
experience in Aids prevention, widen 
their jurisdiction to include women. 
They were a valuable resource but 
women with HIV saw them as gay 
organisations, not relevant to their 
needs.
Women with the virus often face 
dilemmas which gay men do not ex­
perience. For example, childbearing is 
a critical issue for some women with 
HIV, Asymptomatic women with the
possibility of a long life, sometimes 
desperately want to have a child for 
the same reasons any woman may 
want to have a child.
Yet doctors and family may be hor­
rified by a woman's 'selfishness' and 
persuade her the risk of the baby con­
tracting the virus is too high. Pregnant 
women may be coerced into having an 
abortion on the basis of misinforma­
tion.
Sarah said one woman had an abor­
tion after a doctor told her the baby 
had an 80% chance of being HIV posi­
tive.
Amelia Tyler said that there was a 
one-in-four chance of a child contract­
ing the virus from an asymptomatic 
mother. The baby*s immune status 
was unclear until the age of 18 months 
or so.
‘ Women are made to feel wicked and 
guilty if they go ahead with a preg­
nancy. It's a hell of a big decision 
women don't take lightly," said 
Amelia Tyler, "but if they have a heal­
thy baby their lives could be 
fabulous."
Sarah said women who decided not to 
have children often suffered pain and 
grief, and could not tell the truth to 
many people. As well, if they did not 
already have a partner, they faced a 
difficult sodal life.
"At what stage do you tell a potential 
partner? It's frightening for a woman 
to broach the subject because of the 
assumptions that may be made about 
her lifestyle," said Sarah.
Some women at last August*s 4th Na­
tional Aids Conference in Canberra 
felt strongly that women have been 
overlooked in the Aids prevention 
and health care campaigns.
It is clear that HIV positive women 
have been marginalised until recently, 
given scant recognition for the par­
ticular problems and prejudices they 
face. Sarah, for example, has lived 
with the virus for nearly seven yean
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but it is only in the past year that 
official attention has been paid to 
women in her situation.
Recently the federal government has 
allocated funds for several Women 
and Aids projects, including a grant to 
(he Positive Women group to formu­
late an information package and a 
video based on the experiences of 
women with the virus.
As well, the Social Biology Resource 
Centre, in Melbourne, is devising two 
videos for wide distribution which 
aim to make women more assertive in 
sexual situations. Based on a lot of 
Beldwork. which shows that even the 
most assured woman may be passive 
in bed, the videos will help women 
learn to negotiate sexual practices.
'A lot of women don't practice safe 
sex because they don't feel brave 
enough,' said Geraldine Thomson,
co-ordinator of the project. 'The most 
appropriate skills can be taught 
through assertiveness training."
Few would dispute that women need 
to be encouraged to carry condoms, 
and insist they be worn, or to avoid 
intercourse if condoms are not avail­
able.
However, some people question 
whether singling out women with 
special programs and campaigns is a 
good strategy in the fight against 
Aids. Too much special attention on 
women may have the effect of placing 
the responsibility and the guilt on 
them.
Susan Kippax, associate professor in 
behavioural sciences at Macquarie 
U niversity, advised the federal 
government against enthusiastic par­
ticipation in the World Health 
Organisation's Women and Aids Day
last November. "I said, 'hang on, let's 
direct any campaign to men and 
women'," she recalls.
It is easy for women to be cast again 
into the role of controller of men's 
mythic rampant urge to penetrate. 
The early condom campaign with its 
message, 'It's  not on, if it's not on", 
was directed at women. Yet to expect 
women to have power over men in a 
sexual situation, when they are usual­
ly less powerful in every other situa­
tion, may be putting women into an 
im possible bind. Certainly men 
should not be considered as hopeless 
and irresponsible and cast aside in any 
future advertising campaigns. Men, 
as much as women, need to be edu­
cated about heterosexual transmis­
sion and convinced to take equal 
responsibility for practising safe sex.
ADELE HORIN is a journalist with the
Sydney Morning Herald,
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The loudest Left response to the Gulf crisis has been a 
non-political'no' to war in general. Yet the Left also 
commonly endorses violence in world affairs. For Colin 
Mercer; this is a watershed in Left belief The death of 
communism has left the politics of critique rudderless, and 
ushered in a new politics of policy.
T
he war in the Middle East will probab­
ly, sometime, be seen as a threshold in 
the development of Left political cul­
ture in Australia and, for that matter, 
many other countries. The war has an exceptional 
status, not just because of the features which are 
unique to it— the role of the United Nations espe­
cially— but also because it occurs in the context 
of a massive reorganisation of international rela­
tions of power and the effective geo-political 
disappearance of communism as both a govern­
ment and oppositional force.
This is a threshold between one political logic and another: 
between, roughly speaking, a politics informed and 
dominated by the idea of critique and a politics informed 
by the ethos of policy. A politics informed by the idea of 
critique can operate comfortably on thebasisof big 'causes' 
(in both senses). According to one component of this logic 
the current Gulf War can be seen as the pernicious effect of 
a history of imperialism and the exploitation of the people 
and resources of the Middle East: blood for oil, as the 
slogan insists.
Well, yes, if you were writing a long-term history of rela­
tions between the Western powers and the Middle East, 
this is certainly a pattern which would plausibly emerge 
as a general explanation. This is a compelling and effective 
account: the West has little to be proud of in its historical 
and contemporary policies, attitudes and relations 
towards the Near, Middle or Far East.
It is an account, however, which, no matter how plausible 
it might be in the grander sweep of 'historical time', and 
no matter how useful it might be in informing decisions on 
the shape and nature of a post-war settlement, does not 
necessarily help a great deal in the much shorter span and 
messier context of 'political time'. There are different 
mechanisms and quite specific logics which apply to long­
term historical and political analysis on the one hand and 
shorter-term political decision-making on the other. Grand 
histories of class, o f sodal structure and, in general, of those 
patterns of dominance on which much political analysis 
rests, pose the same sorts of problems.
As a response to this there is no need, according to some 
prevailing political and moral precepts, to concede priority 
to pragmatism over principle (the opposition is frequently 
a false one anyway). Rather, it is to recognise that there is 
a real and effective difference between the sort of analysis
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which gets applied to the longer historical span and the 
decision-making procedures which determine policy in 
and for the present. Sometimes these orders overlap. More 
frequently they don't. The point is that they don't have to 
and it's a peculiarly pure mode of political analysis which 
can align its policies and decisions at every stage with the 
general precepts of its guiding doctrines.
The waters of political time are muddied in the case of the 
current conflict in the Middle East by, among other things. 
United Nations agreements and treaties on political 
sovereignty and the implications of invasion, by the fact of 
a 28 nation agreementon the United Nations resolution on 
Kuwait, by domestic and international law and obliga­
tions, by the presence of chemical and biological warfare 
capacities beyond all treaty parameters, by the fact that 
Saddam has used these capacities on Kurdish and Iranian 
populations and has said that he will also do so on a nation 
which is 'technically' non-combatant in this conflict—Is­
rael—and, finally, by differing levels of public support for 
various forms of involvement. These are difficult and com­
plicated, 'present-tense' policy matters which are not well- 
addressed by the certainties of some forms of historical 
explanation currently being used as argument for non-in­
volvement.
So, this is not an argument about expediency but, rather, 
about recognising that there are real differences between 
the types of analysis and explanation that are relevant at 
the 'grand' level of historical, social and geo-political 
development and those that are pertinent in the domain of 
everyday policy considerations. The non-Labor Left has 
been good at the former but has had some problems with 
the latter, notwithstanding the advice to think globally and 
act locally. This has to do with political and intellectual 
affiliations with various forms of grand social theory, par­
ticularly, though not exclusively, with marxism both as a 
theory and as a credo of government. Grand social theory, 
whether in the form of marxism, the variants of sociology 
often adopted by political radicals in arguments about 
class, some theories of patriarchy or the environmentalist 
use of the idea of the 'planet' as a prime mover, tends to be 
accompanied by grand explanatory principles or causes 
from which effects can easily be read off. In this sense they 
are, more or less, 'total theories' in so far as they attempt to 
explain how things hang together, how they interact and 
how certain outcomes are pretty much inevitable.
At the political level, grand theories can operate quite 
comfortably in an 'I told you so' attitude. Readings of the 
Gulf War which view it only as an outcome, through a
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grand theory of imperialism, of an historic pattern of ex­
ploitation, or as the effect of masculine forms of aggressive 
behaviour, or as the predictable outcome of human ex­
ploitation of natural resources fall into this category. These 
explanations may be comforting retrospectively and they 
may also, at this level of explanation, be true, but they do 
not provide many of the necessary tools of engagement in 
policy in the here and now. From the side of resources, is 
it possible for governments to ignore the effects of the 
invasion on the supply of oil by consent and trade to those 
economies which need it to survive? From the side of 
human rights and international law is it possible to ignore 
an invasion of a sovereign territory? If we are willing to 
cite the cases of East Timor, Grenada and Panama as ex­
amples of when this policy has been shamefully ignored 
then surely the argument is that they should not have been 
ignored and something should have been done about it. 
What should have been done? Might it not have involved 
the United Nations, sanctions and some form of interven­
tion by a UN approved force?
There is a question, then, of how content we can be with 
the general slogans of 'Peace' or'Anti-War' as political 
principles. While they can have definite and measurable 
effects as slogans in specific campaigns—Vietnam, nuclear 
disarm ament, etc— they cannot work as policy 
fra me works, and nor should they be intended to. To say 
that you are for peace and against war is not a political 
position but an ethical stance to which pacifists and others 
are entitled but which is destined not to have much politi­
cal clout in a country which has a non-conscripted defence 
force, is a member of the United Nations and party to other 
treaty arrangements. What would you do in these cir­
cumstances? In your day-to-day practice you would need 
to be asking little questions rather than big ones. Peace in 
what and on whose terms? Which war? Vietnam? Cam­
bodia? Nicaragua? El Salvador? Romania? To be pacifist in 
relation to these conflicts is surely meaningless in political 
terms. It is not possible for the Left to 'heroise' some 
conflicts and denigrate others simply because of the nature 
of the key antagonists.
These are constrained policy questions which trouble the 
general critical and ethical position—the critique posi­
tion—of 'anti-war' and they have been posed in this jour­
nal and eisewhere recently In the November issue of ALR, 
Fred Halliday, well known for his associations with the 
intellectual far Left in the 60s and 70s, a respected analyst 
and writer on the Middle East and now Professor of Inter­
national Relations at the London School of Economice, 
argued broadly in favour of 'the West doing something 
about it'. In Australia, Albert Langer, doyen of the far Left 
in the Vietnam Moratorium period, put it this way (in The 
Australian)-. "I cannot follow the US example of selective 
indignation. I cannot support armed struggle against US 
aggression in Vietnam and armed resistance to the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and fail to support armed 
opposition to the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait". Bernie Taft 
has also argued, in The Age, that "...we have a moral 
obligation for a limited participation, in order to make this 
military action, as much as we can, a United Nations and 
not simply a United States affair.” This requirement— 
along with appropriate monitoring of Australian involve­
ment, pressures to strictly observe the UN mandate, and 
to avoid the bombing of civilian populations and in­
frastructure, to move at every stage and wherever possible 
towards ceasefire arrangements, to make sure that the 
pieces and players are in place for a long-term settlement 
and to ensure adequate media reportage—represents a 
plausible and achievable response to the crisis.
The slogan 'No blood for oil' is an exemplary form of 
critique politics but is not much help in these circumstan­
ces. Dirty, smelly and environmentally unfriendly as this 
fossil fuel may be when extracted and burnt, it is nonethe­
less still a vital resource in running households, industries 
and economies in First, Second and Third World 
countries—more dramatically so in the latter than in the 
former. These are the 'little' but vitally important issues 
which get in the way of big stances and complicate the 
drawing up of a big picture in which we can all witness the 
truth. Access to vital resources is something that people 
usually fight for and go to war over. The Left has usually 
supported these fights. The ANC fights for such resources 
in South Africa. The Sandinistas fought for commodities 
such as coffee, bananas, cotton and fish in Nicaragua. 
Human rights are rights of access to basic pnysical resour­
ces as well as to principles of political liberty and 
democracy. These are wars too, and to be anti-war in these 
circumstances is politically vacuous.
The slogan 'No blood for oil' wouldn't mean much to the 
poverty-stricken urban populations of the Philippines or 
India who are increasingly and dramatically feeling the 
effects, in terms of consumption and family income, of the 
rising prices and scarcity of oil produced by Iraq's military 
occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent conflict. To make 
oil sound like a superficial substance compared with the 
emotive qualities of blood is about as meaningful as sug­
gesting to remote Aboriginal communities that blood is 
more important than water. Zappy little phrases which trip 
easily off the tongue on street marches don't always trans­
late into politically achievable objectives. In other words, 
great causes but few effects. Dirty little difficulties and 
policy conundrums get in the way of totalising theories 
and smart slogans. Nothing against slogans here: they are 
intended to be economic and emotive in their effects, but 
let's recognise that they are a quite distinct theoretical use 
of language, addressed to particular audiences in specific 
circumstances and not an embodiment of a general truth.
Totalising theories and smart slogans are the province of 
rnir ' ’tarian movements who are content to remain 
minoricarian. This is a key problem both in relation to the 
present Gulf War and to longer term problems of Left and 
democratic politics: who is being addressed? Th° 70-80% 
of the populations of Australia, the US, the UK or France 
who are 'in favour of but do not necessarily support (this 
is an important distinction from the point of view of policy) 
the actions of the coalition countries? Does the politics of 
critique have a language which can address these 
majorities or is it happier to speak only to its own con­
stituents? There are few signs, in some of the present 
stances on the war from the non-Labor Left, of the emer­
gence of the sort of language and political stance which can 
effectively address the real problems of oil shortages, the
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new role which the United Nations is assuming, the issues 
which follow from the new relations between the USA and 
the USSR, or Australia's defence policy and commitments. 
The history which led to the conflict is clearly visible and 
many have a clearer idea or set of hopes about the nature 
of the settlement after the conflict including a significant 
presence for the Palestinians but, between this looking 
backwards and looking forward there is a blank spot at the 
site of the politics of the present. This is a problem.
This is not, however, an article about the Gulf War. It is, 
rather, about a 'lag' in political culture between the 
generalities and certainties of critique, a legacy of an older 
order in politics, intellectual practice and, indeed, the 
world, which the Gulf War increasingly serves to highlight. 
It is about the need for democratic Left political culture to 
complete—or effect—a transition from the domain of criti­
que to the field of policy: from the purely oppositional to 
the plausibly governmental.
We can be assisted in this if we will recognise what's going 
on at the level of training in political and other competen­
ces, both formally in the education system and informally 
in bureaucracies, workplaces and communities. A few 
months back I got a phone call from a reporter atthe Sunday 
in Melbourne which reminded me of the large gap 
between the two types of political behaviour at issue here. 
He asked me, as a "social theorist" (I became instantly 
suspicious) whether I regretted the demise of the 
'maverick radicalism" so prominent in the 1960s and early 
1970s. 1 wasn't in Australia in the 1960s and 70s and all I 
could think of were Tariq Ali and Robin Blackburn. This 
didn't help. The gist of my answer, in any case, was: no, I 
didn't. I suggested, politely, that many of those people who 
might have fallen under the unfortunate heading of 
maverick radicalism were now gainfully employed in 
various agencies, both public and private, of social, 
economic and cultural policy and that this should not be 
held against them. They were probably, I suggested, 
achieving more now than they ever did in the media- 
visible domain of public protest.
This is the same sort of question as 'why aren't students 
ndical any more?' which we are always being asked— 
mostly by ex-students from the 60s and 70s now working 
for newspapers and doing pop socio-psychologies of lost 
tribes. As a generality, students aren't any more or less 
radical now than they were 20 years ago. They are just 
doing different things which happen not to take place in 
the streets, and are therefore not public or, at least repre­
sentable, critique. A policy adviser or a bureaue.ut at the 
Trade Development Commission, the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities Commission, the Affirmative Action 
Agency or the National Board for Employment, Education 
and Training is not, after all, good copy. These people are 
responding, in their chosen career paths, to both a reality 
and to changed circumstances which some of their teachers 
from another age may have failed to recognise: that 
government—or 'governmentality' as some have called 
it—is not confined to the legislature or to the central ap­
paratuses of the State. One key lesson that was learnt from 
the 1960s and 70s from feminists, from the work of writers 
such as Gramsci and Foucault and many others, is that
government happens in lots of places and that it is not 
necessarily experienced as forms of oppression or in­
trusion. It has its positive and productive dimensions too 
and this is one of the reasons for a change in political 
culture among a whole generation of people initially 
trained in the orders of critique but now operationalising 
those capacities effectively in the machinery of govern­
ment and quasi-govemmental organisations.
This has little to do, then, with some universal principle of 
pragmatism in hard economic times which makes people 
turn their eyes from the light on the hill to the economic 
realities on the doorstep: it is the implementation of the 
capacities in which they have been trained. Many of those 
students trained in the critical analysis of the dominant 
culture, in the critique of political economy, in the critical 
analysis of the sodal structure are now making their skills 
operational in advertising agencies and journalism, in the 
treasury, taxation offices or other economic instrumen­
talities, in sodal policy and welfare agenries and so on. 
This is not a problem. It is why they were trained in those 
skills in the first place: to get a job, not a priestly calling. It 
is surely profoundly elitist to complain retrospectively—or 
to put up the idea in order to sell copy—that there has been 
a 'sell-out' or a conservative turn in the culture of student 
expectations and career paths. This is a nonsense which 
thrives on the idea that there was a moment, a Golden Age, 
of radicalism in which the universities were the prime 
movers and the students the exemplary cadres.
Universities occupy an important but profoundly am­
biguous position in the culture of protest and opposition, 
providing as they do, both the key cadres for the actual 
implementation of government policy and the symbolic 
opposition. This is one of the reasons why we keep getting 
asked why students aren't radical any more. The reason for 
going to university, after all, is to get trained professionally 
in various skills. It is not intended as a novitiate in prepara­
tion for the orders of pure critique. Those endowed with 
the capabilities to occupy this position through historical, 
philosophical, literary or economic training and to be 
named and published as such, are perhaps one in several 
thousand. The skills that are taught may also be critical 
ones of analysis, argumentation, the presentation of a criti­
cal position and so on, but, whether in the humanities or 
law, the sodal, pure or applied sdences, these are only 
components of a more general program of training and not 
its ultimate object. Dawkins-esque as this may sound and 
horrible to behold as it may be for a whole generation of 
radical intellectuals, it is nonetheless the case that univer­
sities have no spedal privileges in the domain of what 
Marx once called, disparagingly, "critical criticism". As 
Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out in relation to the par­
ticularly hierarchically-structured French tertiary educa­
tion system, there is absolutely no reason why we should 
expect universities to be the natural repositories of critique. 
Political intellectuals are, in fact, much more likely to 
emerge now, and especially in Australia, from trade 
unions, community and welfare organisations and the 
legal system than they are from the assumed critical ether 
of the universities. It's as well to put this icon of protest and 
opposition in its proper place.
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In addition to laying the ghost of critical icons, there are— 
forgive the phrase—'world-historical' reasons for both the 
reality and desirability of a shift from critique to policy. 
Marxism in government—the historical reminder to both 
the left and the rest of the world that however new, strug­
gling and downright grubby, a systemic alternative was 
possible— has been seen to be an almost entire failure, as a 
form of government, in any of its evident forms. This is not 
to say that in a whole range of fields, from foreign policy 
to agrarian reform, literacy, equal employment oppor­
tunity and the treatment of ethnic minorities, there is noth­
ing to be learnt from this history: simply that, domestically 
and internationally, as a plausible form of government, it 
did not work. After scanning the world for acceptable 
communist models—China, Cuba, etc—and finally en­
ding up with the formula of'actually existing socialism' it 
is clear that there is nowhere else to look. To hiss 'social 
democrat' no longer counts as an insult except at a few 
academic conferences and, presumably, at meetings of the 
few ultra-leftist rumps that still exist. It is clear, I think, 
that the integrity—meaning 'wholeness', not 'honesty'— 
of socialism as such, including the actions, theories and 
cultures of the communist and mainstream social- 
democratic traditions, is no longer very clear to any but the 
most resolute optimist and clarity will only be achieved in 
these circumstances by developing a 'politics of the 
present' fairly quickly.
In Australia, a Labor ascendancy since the early 1980s, the 
emergence of the various social justice bureaucracies in 
multiculturalism^human rights, EEO and Affirmative Ac­
tion have provided fertile ground for cautious but often 
career-based alliances with the machinery of the State and 
the various formal and informal, public and private in­
stitutions of government from schools to trade unions and 
community organisations.
But does this mean that when Labor gets thrown out of 
office we will see again the emergence of the maverick 
radical? I don't think so: the return of the repressed is not 
on the agenda and, in any case, there is no space for such 
a figure to operate any more. Not even the environmental 
movement—which is where most mavericks and radicals 
are likely to emerge these days—is likely to mortgage its 
hard-won presence within the field of public policy to the 
image of Joshua at Jericho. The walls are still standing after 
all: it s the battlelines which have changed in a thorough 
transition from, as Gramsci put it, a war of movement 
(which never actually moved anywhere) to a war of posi­
tion. The metaphorical language of war, battles and, most 
of all, struggles, is something of a legacy of the earlier 
moment. We are now more in the era of tactical engage­
ments, strategic development, flexible specialisation 
and conflict resolution procedures.
Should we be worried about this? Not too much. There has 
been a steady process of settling of accounts and of 
erstwhile philosophical consciences accelerated in 
Australia by that older tradition of 'fabianism' in critical 
intellectual thought. Australians have more readily and 
rapidly assumed a little portion of 'the mentality of 
government' than their Anglo-saxon counterparts else­
where in the world. There is an increasing osmosis be­
tween those agendes responsible for the production of 
intellectuals, broadly defined, whether in the trade unions, 
community organisations, political parties or universities, 
and the general domain of government.
In this context, the shift from Critique with a big 'C' to 
Policy with a big 'P  which has been going on in political 
and academic culture over recent years cannot be repre- . 
sented as just growing up and out of a Young Turk period. 
This is a newsy way of representing the situation but also 
quite wrong. Political, intellectual and governmenta! cul-1 
ture have changed drastically over the past 20 years. Grand I 
theories have nose-dived and along with them have gone 
many of the certainties about the nature of society and 
social structure, of social power and, above all, the ability I 
to identify effective single causes of the effects that we see I 
around us. The cult of the postmodern as an era of frag-1 
mentation, of dispersal of the firm foundations of > 
knowledge and experience is simply an effervescence in | 
the academies, publishing houses and advertising agen-1 
cies but the bubbles do, in fact, suggest more profound * 
movements in the substrata of political culture.
These movements are caused precisely by the levels ol 
'political professionalisation' of those cadres who might 
hitherto have been happy in the era of critique. With this > 
political professionalisation goes a level of specialisation, 
a narrowing down of concerns and a more precise target-1 
ing of political and policy objectives. Not war as such but 
the conduct of this war. Not racism or sexism as such but 
this instance of malpractice or discrimination. As impor> I 
tant is to teach and disseminate information about the. 
general problems of war, racism and sexism, it is equally * 
important to teach the 'tactical' ways of handling these! 
problems in everyday life by constantly posing the ques- [ 
tion, "What do you do now?" The politics of critique only I 
completes the first stage of this process. It is more difficult, j 
but absolutely necessary, to move to the stage of positive 
but complex elaboration.
With this professionalisation and specialisation goes a l 
necessary recognition of the sheer complex pluralism, den­
sity and complexity of social relations: the recognition thal) 
what we call society is not a transparent social structure! 
where things and people can be ordered and harmonised I 
according to the principles of far-sighted doctrines or his­
torical lesson-teach ing. People working in the areas of law, I 
social and economic policy know this well.
If we remain committed to social change, social theory and 
social analysis, then it seems important to begin to move I 
in a little closer and to turn our attention more systemati­
cally to that present complexity and to the politics of the 
present. This also means policies for the present. Other-! 
wise it is likely that, despite the best intentions, as some-x 
body once said, we will be confined only to interpreting C 
the world while others, perhaps less sympathetic, will got 
about changing it. ,
COLIN MERCER teaches in Humanities at Griffith Univer*K 
sity, and is a member of ALR's editorial collective.
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War of
PRINCIPLES
The debate over the Gulf has been presented on all sides as 
a cut-and-dried affair: Left pacifism vs the pro-American 
Right. In the process, the debate over principle has been 
lost. Here, as a contribution to the debate-that-wasn't, 
ALR publishes the very different views of a variety of 
voices from the wider Left.
Smart Bomb,
Dumb Aimer
The war is wrong, says M ik e  M cK in ley . But even if it weren't, you 
wouldn't want to get too close to the Am ericans while they were fighting it.
n every basis I can think of I am op­
posed to the allied strategy of war in 
the Gulf. In any case, I would have the 
greatest difficulty in reconciling a view
that was a justified response to Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait with the knowledge I have of the US 
record in war. This knowledge, by the way, is not 
some arcane possession of the strategic analyst,
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but an accessible and published body of data and 
commentary freely available to those who can 
read. I therefore begin with two open questions 
about Australia's policy advisers, and policy­
makers: how do they get away with it?; how have 
they got away with it for so long?
My point is this: notwithstanding the need I feel to resist 
this war at the level of principle, there is the question of US 
military competence to consider. Or, to be more precise, the 
demonstrated military incompetence of our major alliance 
partner and leading power of the anti-Iraq coalition. In 
other words, I am advancing the prudential argument that 
even if Australia's Gulf policies could ever be regarded as 
unproblematic, their standing is compromised by the com­
pany they keep.
This pessimistic conclusion is informed by an analysis—  
indeed the realist analysis so beloved by the policy-making 
com m u n ity — of US in v o lv em en t across the w hole 
spectrum of conventional conflict over the last 41 years. 
1950 is significant here since it located what one typical, 
recent study by US scholars recalls as "the last major 
victory for Am erican arm s". In the subsequent four 
decades we find that US military efforts have been, and 
are, no model of competence. From the record, which 
includes the overall debacle in Indo-China and also the 
more than 120 specially designated rescue and other 
operations in that conflict, through still more rescue mis­
sions such as those in support of the Mayuguez, and in 
interventions, such as those in Grenada and Panama, the 
US armed forces performed in a manner which allows 
neither confidence in themselves nor on the part of allies 
co-operating with them.
The basic data and an analytical literature attesting to this 
have been available, cumulatively, since 1950 and are, 
moreover, marked by four characteristics: 1) the data-base 
is broadly agreed on; 2) the analyses are provided by 
specialists from a wide range of the political spectrum; 3) 
there is broad agreement among their findings; 4) their 
judgments are reached on criteria established by the US 
military itself and on which there is a consensus among 
similar analysts outside the US.
Since space precludes a detailed excursion into any of the 
events in question I will mention only that the Middle East 
has provided some of the richest and most embarrassing 
examples of incompetence. Among these we must include 
operation Desert One— the failed hostage rescue mission 
in Iran— and the interventions in Beirut, including the 
criminal negligence which led to the loss of over 250 
marines in a single one-man attack on their accommoda­
tion and the equally criminal, indiscriminate use of US 
naval firepower against the non-combatants of the Shouf 
mountains and other locales. Probably the most dramatic 
example, however, was the April 1986 bombing of Libya 
where 15 F - l l l  fighter-bombers equipped with a laser 
guidance bombing system, and carrying a combination of 
cluster bombs and 2000-pound bombs could not ac­
complish their mission of assassinating Colonel Muammar
Al-Ghaddafi. This example is particularly poignant in i  
context of cost per outcome as well. It was attempted! 
two aircraft carriers costing $5 billion each which were! 
tu rn , defended by escort ships worth around $12 billijf 
as well as their aircraft complement, each aeroplane cogi 
ing $30-50 million— all in order to support a failed mur J  
which was reducible to the equivalent of hitting a tent I  
a football field inhabited by one man, who was, eventhl 
an irritating but hardly substantial enemy.
The Gulf, nevertheless, is the true pons asinorum (brijf 
of fools, site of all its embarrassment) for the US milital 
We have witnessed the May 1987 Iraqi attack on the U® 
Stark after w hich the US punished Iran  and placfj 
American flags on tankers belonging to Iraq's ally, Kuwal 
the patently absurd Gulf convoy operation which saw t l  
US Navy have the 400,000-ton supertanker BridgeA 
deployed in front of three American warships that wei 
supposed to be protecting it; the April 1988 aborted attal 
by the USS Merrill using Harpoon anti-ship missila 
ag ain st a Soviet Sovrem enny class guided missil 
destroyerin the mistaken belief th atitw asan  Iranian Saal 
class guided missile frigate; and the July 1988 shootirl 
down of Iran Air flight 655 by the USS Vincennes. ;
Even in the period of the build-up for Desert Storm § 
many US service personnel were needlessly killed—near! 
100 in my estimation— that by early October 1990 all USA1 
Gulf training flights were cancelled so that a 'safetlj 
awareness' study could be conducted instead. I hardijl 
need add that this comes only one year after the US Navy 
was stood down for similar reasons for a period of 41 
hours.
And although I could continue to catalogue other incom­
petences in the field of weapons and material, doctrine and 
morale, to name just four, I will resist the temptation todj 
so in favour of citing Richard Gabriel's quite typical coiij 
elusion to his study of the overall phenomenon: "The! 
American military is in serious trouble. Its recent historical 
performance...has been marked far more often by failure 
than success. Its military plans have been unrealistic and 
unsuccessful. The officer corps, by any historical standard, 
is lacking in the spirit and expertise that have characterised 
the more successful officer corps in history. Worse, it is 
infected by habits and values which are characteristic of 
many of the worst officer corps in history. The record is 
clear that the [American] officer corps has failed the single 
test of a successful army, the ability to perform well on the 
field of battle."
I write this as the war nears the close of its fourth week, 
with the US lost for a strategy other than bombing, and its; 
ground force commanders uncertain whether 70,000 sor-! 
ties is sufficient to allow them success. And of all the 
Americans confirmed dead in Desert Storm to date, ‘W1* 
have died in non-combatant incidents or from "friendly 
fire".
M IKE M cKINLEY teaches in political science a* the 
Australian National University.
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An Absence 
of Debate
J o  Vallentine looks to a new world order built on justice rather than tanks.
O ne of the most ironic aspects of the Gulf War has been the way in which the industrialised nations have chosen to 
present the crusade against Iraq as a 
warning to future potential aggressors in the 
name of their projected New World Order.
At the same time, they have refused to acknowledge their 
own role in creating the problem over the last ten years, a 
period which saw some 30 countries sell $46 billion worth 
of arms—plus technology—to the regime of Saddam Hus­
sein, making it the world's largest importer of arms by the 
second half of the last decade.
According to Western intelligence officials and a variety of 
military experts, Saddam Hussein was able to amass the 
most powerful items for his arsenal by appealing to two 
strong emotions among his foreign suppliers: their hunger 
for Iraqi petro-dollars and, in the West particularly, their 
fear of an Iranian victory in the 1980-88 Gulf War. On top 
of weapons, the US approved the export to Iraq of US$1.5
■ billion worth of items with dual military and civilian use, 
including powerful computers, precision machine tools 
and advanced electronics. Asked why this was possible, an 
anonymous intelligence official said: "Frankly, until the 
invasion, there was no political will to stop the Iraqis."
Michael Maloof, director of technology security operations 
at the Pentagon's department for trade security policy, 
admitted: "The reality is that our guys in the desert are now 
facing sophisticated American technology sold to the 
Iraqis over the years by the Commerce Department."
Australia did place an arms embargo on Iran and Iraq 
during the war but lifted it when the war ended and was 
on the point of concluding a deal in spare parts for Iraqi 
Air Force trainer aircraft worth $850,000 when Iraq in­
vaded Kuwait.
By February this year, Senator Robert Ray as Minister for 
Defence, was admitting to the National Press Club that he 
saw a need to control and reduce the international arms 
bade. However, he has yet to announce what Australia will 
do to stem the arms trade and so far has declined to 
withdraw official support from Australia's International 
Defence Equipment Exhibition (AIDEX 91), scheduled to
be held in Canberra this November, or to abandon the goal 
of doubling military exports, recommended in the 1986 
Cooksey Report.
Twenty or so years from now, the Gulf War will be seen 
primarily as a resource war but much will depend on 
whether countries like the United States have learned by 
then to curb their appetite for cheap oil. There were efforts 
to improve energy efficiency and conservation after the 
first oil shock in 1973 but as OPEC's power declined, the 
world slipped back into its old ways. So far the Gulf War 
has not driven up oil prices but the long-term problem of 
oil dependency remains.
One of the more ludicrous arguments over the war con­
cerns "linkage"—or should we acknowledge the Arab 
world's concern over the UN's selective indignation con­
cerning Kuwait but not Israel's continued flouting of UN 
resolutions on the Occupied Territories since 1967?
There was talk of a general conference on Israel/Palestine 
before the Gulf War and there is talk of one after it's all over, 
but no connection can be acknowledged in the meantime, 
in case it is perceived as rewarding Saddam Hussein.
Vet the war has already strengthened the bond between the 
United States and Israel, and boosted Israel's attempts to 
isolate the PLO diplomatically. At the same time, extremist 
forces on both sides can only gain support whatever the 
outcome of the war—Israeli extremists, such as those who 
want to expel all Arabs from within their borders, and 
Moslem fundamentalist groups like Hamas (Zeal) which 
is already drawing support away from the PLO in places 
like the Gaza Strip.
In most other countries in North America and West Europe 
there has been a lively political debate, despite the commit­
ment of the NATO members to the war effort. In Australia, 
as a result of the bipartisan foreign policy position of the 
ALP and the coalition, any meaningful political debate has 
been stifled while only 4% of federal politicians represent 
the 30% of Australians who are opposed to Australia's 
involvement in the war.
Even this does not satisfy the war party who have now 
turned on the ABC for giving reasonably balanced 
coverage of the war itself and played into the hands of
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those conservative forces who were out to curb the ABC's 
independence even before the war began.
With the Soviet Union passively supporting the US posi­
tion, the peace movement can no longer be labelled "com­
munist". The latest abuse by supporters of the war option 
derives from the 1930s when charges were laid against the 
peace movement of wanting appeasement and "peace at 
any price". One letter writer to the Launceston Examiner (12 
February) wanted to intern all critics of the war to 
segregate them from loyal Australians.
There is no acknowledgment of the fact that no one in the 
peace movement is advocating that Iraq remains in control 
of Kuwait. The argument is over how to get Iraq out of 
Kuwait—continued sanctions and negotiations or war.
Once a war is under way it is hard to stop. After the initial 
rallies, the peace movement will have to develop a long­
term strategy, with particular focus on bridge-building and 
reconciliation when the war ends, just as pacifist groups 
did with the people of Germany and Japan after World War 
Two.
Clearly we need to learn more about the Middle East, the 
Arab World and Islam. We have to come up with creative
suggestions to give the United Nations a constructive 
central role in settling disputes and peacekeeping rather 
than acting as a rubber stamp for US military power.
There also needs to be an awareness of how the war has 
allowed the rehabilitation of unpleasant repressive 
regimes like China, Syria and Turkey, as well as letting the 
forces of reaction gain the upper hand in the Soviet Union. 
Once more the Baltic States may be the victims of world 
indifference while the UN wages its Holy war in the Gulf 
in an eerie parallel with the events of 1956.
As for the New World Order, there is nothing new about 
using military force to get what you want and we have yet 
to hear any details of what else it involves. A real New 
World Order would be based on non-military solutions to 
conflict, an end to the global arms trade, the equitable 
distribution of resources, a just price for commodities and 
the establishment of international forums to resolve global 
problems like the Greenhouse effect and other problems 
that transcend national boundaries.
JO VALLENTINE is Independent federal senator from 
Western Australia.
An Orrery of 
Errors
John  Langm ore argues that, although there were numerous 
opportunities to stop short o f war, the war itself is not unjust.
T
here is no doubt that Iraq had no jus­
tification for invading Kuwait, which 
was an independent country with in­
ternationally recognised and accepted 
borders. Saddam Hussein is a megalomaniac and 
a ruthless dictator and nothing in his behaviour 
or policies has suggested that he has any willing­
ness to act reasonably in accordance with inter­
national norms.
Nevertheless, throughout the Gulf crisis US actions have 
been presented to us as inevitable. Yet at every point 
alternatives were possible, and commonly preferable. Fol­
lowing the UN Security Council's imposition of the trade 
embargo in mid-August, the US quickly began a massive
military build-up in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf waters, 
describing such action as necessary to defend Saudi 
Arabia. But deployment occurred under US, rather than 
UN, control. The US should have adopted the proper 
procedure under the UN Charter and secured a resolution 
under Article 43 to create a United Nations force under the 
United Nations Military Staff Committee. That would 
have provided a more effective command structure, but 
would not have prevented the US from providing the 
general-in-command of overall operations in which the US 
has been by far the largest contributor.
Australia's involvement should certainly have been more 
carefully considered and conditional on deployment 
under a UN Military Staff Committee. In that way, proce­
dures for dealing with reasonable conflict in a post-Cold 
War world could have been established which would have
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enhanced the collective restraint on individual aggressive 
action and international co-operation in opposing and 
penalising aggression. As it now stands, the global com­
munity has regressed from its position of 40 years ago in 
Korea.
It is essential for Australia, too, to independently and 
rigorously review our response to our allies' policies be­
cause for much of the post-war period there has been a 
tendency for Australian governments to accept USpolicies. 
Such a stance denies Australians the opportunity to make 
up their own minds about Australia's long-term best inter­
ests. Hence one lesson from this crisis must be that we 
completely break the habit of consenting to whatever 
policies any US administration chooses to adopt.
President Bush said in his announcement of war against 
Iraq that there was "no choice but to drive Saddam from 
Kuwait by force". That was simply not true. Sanctions were 
working. Certainly his deep concern about attempts by 
Iraq to develop and enhance the effectiveness of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons was justified.
Yet sanctions would have denied the Iraqis much of the 
equipment and material they needed to make those 
weapons or make them more effective. There would have 
been a risk in delaying the alliance attack that Iraq could 
have armed itself with more awful weaponry. Yet it is the 
judgment of many experts and many political leaders, 
including 47 US senators, that reliance on tight, effective 
sanctions would have been preferable to the current war.
The CIA estimated that sanctions were 97% effective. Paul 
Nitze, who was President Reagan's special adviser on arms 
control, wrote in January: "under the current international 
embargo, only a trickle of goods is getting in or out of Iraq; 
oil exports and earnings are nil and civilian production is 
estimated to be down by about 40%. In time, lack of spare 
parts will erode Iraq's military capabilities, and civilian 
and production will fall further."
What should have Australia done? I think that despite the 
misjudgment at several crucial points in the evolution of 
the crisis, it was our responsibility lo complete the task in 
which we were involved. The UN had authorised military 
action. Our government had committed us to this involve­
ment. To withdraw unilaterally would have been destruc­
tive to the alliance and would have appeared cowardly. 
Therefore it was essential that we acted in concert with our 
UN allies.
We can now urge those allies to limit the war to the eviction 
of Iraq from Kuwait and to do this with a minimum of 
destruction —including, for example, limiting the attacks 
to targets of military significance in Iraq.
One constructive task is to look ahead to prepare for the 
post-Gulf world. One goal must be to make the Middle East 
a nuclear, chemical and biological weapons free zone. That 
means not only disarmament by Iraq but that Israel also 
give up its nuclear weapons. As long as any country in the 
region possesses such weapons, there can be no final 
resolution of conflict. That resolution also requires a com­
plete US withdrawal, though this will not occur until stable 
relationships have been forged between Middle Eastern 
countries. That in turn requires some agreement between 
Israel and the Palestinians. So, one step towards permanent 
peace in the Middle East must be a conference on the future 
of Israel and the Palestinians.
War of itself will not provide the solution to those conflicts. 
At best it can simply force the withdrawal of Iraq from 
Kuwait and ensure that would-be aggressors do not profit 
from invasion, coercion and force. The future security of 
the globe depends on enhancing the effectiveness of co­
operative opposition to aggression from whatever source 
it originates.
JOHN LANGMORE is the ALP member for the federal seat 
of Fraser (ACT).
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United We 
Stand
For B ob Howard, there's no serious alternative to collective security, with 
all that implies.
tatements by Labor members during 
the Gulf debate in federal parliament 
indicate that the 'UN  factor'— that the 
allied action was endorsed by the UN—  
was an important element in mobilising and 
holding support within Labor's parliamentary 
ranks both for the war and for Australia's Gulf 
com m itm ent Few should be surprised by this. In 
emphasising the 'UN  factor', Labor members 
were drawing on sentiment deeply embedded in 
ALP thinking on foreign policy. The ALP plat­
form details at some length the party's strong 
commitment to the aims and work of the UN. It 
is part of ALP folklore that one of the party's 
'greats', Dr Evatt, played an important role in 
negotiations leading to the establishment of the 
UN and, in recognition of this, became the first 
president of the UN General Assembly.
What is surprising is that some Labor members were not 
moved by the UN argument. (Shortly after the initial com­
mitment of Australian naval vessels in the early days of the 
crisis, some members of the parliamentary Left protested 
that they could only support Australian involvement if it 
was part of a UN endorsed action. But this undertaking did 
not hold, following a string of UN Security Council resolu­
tions endorsing action against Iraq.) Moreover, it would 
appear that disenchantment with the UN on this issue is 
even more widespread in the Left outside of parliament. 
This indicates an important development in Left thinking 
on international security issues and is worthy of examina­
tion.
Rationalisations for the Left's disenchantment abound. 
Many have argued that the allied force in the Gulf, though 
acting with the sanction of the UN, is not a UN force as 
such; as Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar keeps remind­
ing us, the allied forces are not under the control of the 
Military Staff Committee of the Security Council and the 
blue helmets and flags of the UN are nowhere in evidence. 
Also, many are no doubt offended by what they see as US 
domination and manipulation of the Security Council and
are troubled by the apparent double standards of the world 
body—its eagerness to take action against Iraq, but not 
against Israel, Indonesia, the US, and so on.
These are powerful arguments and are worthy of close 
consideration. But my purpose here is to look at something 
else—to examine the Left's attitude to the UN role in the 
Gulf, the implications for Left thinking on international 
security issues.
To many on the Left, the UN has long had a benign image; 
to the extent to which they have thought about the world 
body at all it has usually been with regard to issues such 
as the decolonisation process, the promotion and monitor­
ing of human rights, the work of UNESCO, famine and 
disaster relief, global and environment programs, and the 
resettlement of refugees. Any acknowledgement that the 
UN has had a security role to play—that it has actually 
used armed force—has been softened by the perception 
that this has usually been for 'peace-keeping7 purposes. 
Underpinning all this are understandable feelings of revul­
sion towards war and to the idea that armed conflict is an 
acceptable means of resolving international disputes. 
Many on the Left clearly regard the use of massive armed 
forces in the name of the UN as doubly offensive. It would 
make little difference to these folk if the allied operation in 
the Gulf was under the control of the Military Staff Com­
mittee of the Security Council. There would still be objec­
tions to the Security Council taking military action in 
support of its resolutions. The revulsion would remain.
This scepticism about the UN's role in the Gulf represents 
a significant development in Left-liberal thinking about 
international security. Collective security—the principle of 
'all against one', the entire world against the aggressor— 
was a central feature of the League of Nations created after 
World War One. When the UN was created from the ashes 
of World War Two there was the view that the world had 
suffered dearly because of its appeasement of aggression. 
The aim was that the great powers, acting collectively 
through the Security Council, would be sufficient to over­
whelm would-be aggressors and save future generations 
from the 'scourge of war'.
It is important to emphasise that these ideas were far from 
unacceptable to a whole generation of leftwingers. Many,
like Australia's Dr Evatt, must have felt uneasy about the 
authority accorded the great powers in the new world 
body (Britain, France, China, the USA and the USSR were 
made permanent members of the Security Council and 
each accorded the veto). But all this must have seemed a 
small price to pay for an arrangement that held out the 
promise of a peaceful future. It was recognised that aggres­
sion was a problem in world politics, that something 
needed to be done about it, and that collective security was 
preferable to the alternatives. This approach to what might 
be termed the international security problem was some­
thing the Left was able to live with.
The political tensions of the Cold War, dating from about 
1949, largely crippled the UN in the exercise of its security 
function. But the end of the Cold War changed all that. The 
string of resolutions adopted by the Council since Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait represents an unprecedented display 
of consensus in the world body. For the first time, the 
Council has undertaken an act of enforcement within the 
full meaning of the expression and of the UN Charter's 
provisions. (Because the Soviet Union was temporarily 
boycotting the Security Council and hence did not par­
ticipate in the decision in 1950 to support South Korea, the 
UN's action then cannot be said to have involved collective 
security within the full meaning of the Charter.)
The real significance of the current controversy about the 
UN's role in the Gulf is that, on the occasion of the 
Council's first exercise of its security function within the 
full meaning of the Charter, large sections of the Left have 
questioned the legitimacy of the UN to act in this way.
This raises the question of what the Left might now regard 
as a proper and legitimate response to international 
security problems. The question is an important one, not 
least because the problem of international security will not 
go away In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold 
War there was perhaps the view that, at long last, we might 
be entering a period of peace. But it would be foolish to 
assume this is the case. Factors which in the past have been 
causes of conflict are abundant in our contemporary world: 
irredentist causes; ethnic and nationalist rivalries; religious 
fervour; injustice and denial of human rights; competition
for resources; weapons proliferation and militarism; 
legitimate national security concerns; great power 
chauvinism; and gross inequality between nations and 
regions.
The Left has a responsibility to address itself to the inter­
national security issue. The challenge remains: how to find 
an effective mechanism for limiting the role of force and 
violence in world politics. In view of the apparently limit­
less potential for weapons proliferation and military tech­
nological innovation, peace activists do us all a service in 
reminding us that there is no future in war.
But is the Left equal to the challenge? Issues of war and the 
exercise of force have always been a problem for the liberal 
conscience. The rejection, by large sections of the Left, of 
the legitimacy of the UN role in the Gulf crisis, no doubt 
has many causes. But it is difficult to believe that it does 
not have a lot to do with a deeply felt disinclination to 
countenance the use of force, even by a body like the UN, 
and even when the use of a small amount of force now 
might obviate the need for greater force later. The point was 
nowhere better demonstrated than with regard to the sanc­
tions issue. Sanctions are widely and rightly regarded as 
preferable to the full-scale use of military force. It is a 
tragedy that the problem of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was 
not resolved through the use of sanctions. But effective use 
of the sanctions option in this case required not only a 
willingness on the part of the allies to give them time to 
work, but also, meaningful enforcement. In practice, this 
meant an air and naval blockade of Iraq. But large sections 
of the Left, even while protesting that sanctions were not 
being taken seriously, were demanding that Australia's 
naval contribution to the enforcement of those sanctions, 
be withdrawn.
The point is raised, not in any sense of enthusiasm for the 
use of force, nor even in support of sanctions, but as an 
indication of the intellectual difficulties the Left might 
experience in meeting the challenge of the problems of 
international security problem.
BOB HOWARD teaches in government at the University of 
Sydney and is editor of Current Affairs Bulletin.
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ABUSED
and abandoned
Child abuse fortified by the mystique of satanic rituals has 
become an epidemic in several Western countries, and 
now in Australia. But once saved from the clutches of 
their tormentors, the children are seldom believed. 
Yvonne Preston asks why a horrifying crisis has failed to 
excite the passions of the Left and public authorities alike.
□n the West we take a decidedly jaun­diced view of Pakistan's Moslem laws which require a woman charging rape to produce four male Moslem w it­
nesses to the act before her story is accepted. If, 
as is more than likely, she can produce no wit­
nesses to her ordeal, she risks landing in jail 
herself, accused of the 'crime' of adultery. Primi­
tive as this sounds to us, our supposedly 'supe­
rio r' W estern cultures are rather less than  
enlightened when it comes to the truthfulness of 
women and children.
Freudian notions have perpetuated the slander. The word 
of a woman has had to be proved and the testimony of a 
child has carried even less weight. Where the charge has 
been physical abuse by a male, and the culprit, as is often 
the case, is the woman's husband or the child's father, the 
boundaries of belief have been pushed to the limit. Per­
sonal testimony has seldom been enough by itself. Cor­
roborative evidence, preferably provided by a male has 
been required.
The law no longer sees women and children as male 
property, but it still sees them as lesser beings. All too often 
the female or child victims of men's violence and sexual
abuse in Western society find themselves transformed by 
a blind and disbelieving system into victimisers, accused 
of bearing false and malicious testimony against innocent 
men. All too commonly hysteria is said to be at the root of 
allegations of abuse by women and children. Victims of the 
newly acknowledged and horrifying fact of organised 
abuse of children, of sex rings which depend on recruiting 
children for the gratification of abusers, and of ritualised 
sex abuse with its cult of sexual terrorism and sacrifice are 
accused of fantasising, or cruelly dismissed as liars. Should 
the evidence of these victims of organised and ritual abuse 
be taken down by social workers or police and should it 
come anywhere near being heard in a court of law, it may 
be dismissed as "contam inated", while the child tormen­
tors go free.
i
A Sydney woman who alleged that her two small children 
had suffered ritual sex abuse at a Christian Sunday School 
was told by child protection agencies that the children's 
stories of oral and anal abuse at gross satanic rituals were 
the result of "vivid imaginations".
The mother claims that the girl was forced into oral sex, the 
boy anally abused in macabre ceremonies which have 
echoes in cases from countries as far apart as Britain, the 
United States and the Netherlands. The alleged abuser's 
elderly mother took part in the ritual which included the 
sacrifice of animals. The children called her "the hag".
a i d  • h a a n r ' u  in n  i
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Their horrified mother took the story to the Department of 
Family and Community Services and now alleges that 
officers of the department questioned her mental health. 
Her allegations were rejected by the Minister for Family 
and Community Services, Robert Webster, but the mother 
and her de facto husband, the children's stepfather, under-
"A theatre of sexual 
terrorism has been 
revealed"
went psychiatric examination to prove their mental 
stability, so strongly did they believe their sanity was being 
questioned.
The children were six and seven at the time of the abuse. 
How had they learned this stuff, the mother wants to know. 
She says there is evidence they had been drugged. They 
talked about being given "magic crystals" and feeling 
sleepy. At first police refused to take up her case, arguing 
that the dismissal of charges against a couple accused of 
ritually abusing small children in a northern beaches 
kindergarten before the magistrate even heard the 
children's evidence, deeming it to be "contaminated", 
would make prosecution impossible. The so-called Mr 
Bubbles case did not establish legal precedent, nor set any 
age restriction on the victim in any police investigation, 
lawyers say, but the fact that it is perceived to have done 
so, sending to the community the message that children 
under seven cannot be considered competent witnesses, 
has served to inhibit prosecution in abuse cases, extending 
still further the boundaries of disbelief, compounding 
society's refusal to accept that "such things go on". Police 
eventually took this mother's allegation seriously enough 
to give the family a whole new identity and move it to a 
distant address for its own protection.
The Minister for Family and Community Services wrote to 
the woman expressing his sympathy for the personal dif­
ficulties she and her children faced in coping with such a 
traumatic experience, commenting that "child sex ritual 
abuse is an extremely complex and distressing form of 
abuse of children for everyone involved". Police Minister 
Ted Pickering wrote of his understanding of "the trauma 
being experienced by you and your children". But if the 
establishment at least was inclined to believe her—one step 
in the right direction—it failed totally to act. The Public 
Prosecutor informed the outraged mother that he would
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not be proceeding with the case because of "insufficient 
evidence". Her son was too young to stand up to cross-ex­
amination, he said. He would be easily confused and the 
case would be lost.
Thus is the fact of ritual abuse officially if reluctantly 
acknowledged, the trauma accepted and the suffering of 
children admitted. Yet the perpetrators remain free, a 
threat, as the mother rightly says, to other innocent 
children to whom no-one seems to give a second thought.
Over the last two decades child protection workers have 
had to come to grips with the phenomenon of child batter­
ing and then to acknowledge the fact of widespread sexual 
abuse and the need to act against it. Both crimes are com­
mitted most frequently within the family, where all 
children are most vulnerable. Whole structures of care 
were put in place to deal with "normal" or "ordinary" 
sexual abuse, though frequently they broke down and 
failed to provide full protection for children. In the 
notorious Cleveland case in the UK, the dedicated people 
who sought to protect innocent young children, many of 
them only babies, were pilloried by society, attacked as 
fanatics and destroyers or families, their professional lives 
left in tatters.
In the last few years a further discovery has been made, 
more horrifying even than the crftnes of child battering and 
"normal" sex abuse. The uncovering of evidence of or­
ganised or ritual abuse of children has revealed a theatre 
of sexual terrorism, a discovery which is providing "a real 
measure of the balance of power in society, not only be­
tween adults and children, but between the institutes and 
the children's advocates," writes Beatrix Campbell, 
feminist and long-time campaigner for the rights of women 
and children. "It puts to the test our promises to protect 
children," she says, unconsciously echoing the bitter and 
angry sentiments of the Sydney mother who says the 
evidence of her children's abuse ought properly to gal­
vanise society into action to protect other children still at 
risk while the perpetrators remain at large.
In the United States where the existence of satanic cults 
systematically recruiting, abusing and even sacrificing the 
lives of small children to their bizarre rites has long been 
recognised, a mountain of evidence has accumulated. An 
ex-FBI agent has conducted a lengthy, and often dangerous 
investigation into practising satanic cults, in interviewing 
adult survivors of abuse rituals who tell gruesome tales of 
animal sacrifice, child murder and sexual assault on 
children. Many cases of such abuse occur in kindergartens, 
documented in the standard text Nursery Crimes by David 
Finkelhor. The FBI investigator says the crimes inflicted by 
these people are comparable to the crimes of the Nazis in 
World War Two. He claims that in the United States 
children are kidnapped off the streets, or picked up from 
among the homeless fleeing orphanages or children's 
homes. Tens of thousands of people disappear every year 
in America, he says, never to be heard of again. Satanists 
in the United States come from all professions and have 
infiltrated all walks of life. There are links with drug deal­
ing, prostitution and the rich pornography and snuff 
movie "industries". "Occult crime is a reality."
Decent citizens would prefer to believe such things do not 
happen. How to credit that adults dress up and practise 
arcane and brutal ceremonies in this civilised day and age? 
The ritual of war in the Middle East, where morality is 
subverted and overwhelmingly destructive force un­
leashed on hapless civilians in the name of God and 
democracy points, if such pointer were needed, to the 
limitless capacity for man's inhumanity to man. Beatrix 
Campbell adds her own distinctive explanation: "People 
pray in front of grown men wearing frocks, and presumab­
ly to find both peace and power, they consume, metaphori­
cally, the body of a man. So is it so difficult to believe that 
inversions of that established religion are to be found at 
large? If grown men are capable of dressing up in pinnies 
and sharing secret signs with each other in masonic lodges 
up and down the country, what is so hard about con­
templating the prospect of grown men dressing up in daft 
costumes to invert the meanings of the dominant faith; 
organising rituals to penetrate any orifice available in 
troops of little children; to cut open rabbits, or cats, or 
people, and drink their blood; to shit on silver trays and 
make the children eat it?"
A member of a special investigating unit in the United 
States said occult crime should be seen as the outcome of 
the decline in rationalism, disenchantment with traditional 
religion, the influence of Eastern religions, parapsychol­
ogy, the popularity of pseudo-satanic heavy metal music 
and the proliferation of occult literature. He said cult in­
vestigators have found evidence of human behaviour so 
degraded and disgusting that any right thinking person 
would be sickened.
The ritual and the abuse of the satanic cultists is designed 
to terrify, confuse and, above all, exert power over the 
powerless. Many cases have been reported in Australia. 
Most victims present initially too terrified to tell the tale, 
which leaks out slowly, if at all, over long periods of time. 
Some abused children find refuge in the fragmentation of 
personality which enables them to switch the burden of 
intolerable suffering away from themselves and on to 
somebody else. Most victims have been warned that they 
will be killed, like the animal or even human sacrifices they 
say they have seen, if they tell. There are special "kinder­
garten threats" against small children who are told they 
have a bomb in their tummies and if they tell the bomb will 
explode. The problem of acceptance may be less im- 
plausibility than a case of the consequences of these prac­
tices being unbearable. Even to think of them is intolerable.
In Australia, where acceptance of the unacceptable lags 
behind America, and scepticism is still widespread, some 
authoritative voices match those coming out of the United 
States, claiming the horrors to be fact not fantasy. At the 
11th Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Associa­
tion of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, held last year in 
Melbourne, a doctor of forensic medicine said criminal 
cults were providing a milieu for "evil" people to carry out 
disgusting and bizarre acts for which they would probably 
never be prosecuted. Dr Edward Ogden, of the Victoria 
Police Force office of forensic medicine, is doing an MA 
thesis on satanic cults. He told the congress about children 
having abortions, infants whose births were never
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registered being used as human sacrifices, and adolescents 
being hired for sexual exploitation or used in sexual rituals. 
He reiterated the major contributor to the scepticism which 
greets allegations like those made by the Sydney mother; 
the offences are so bizarre people have difficulty believing 
them.
A Sydney policeman involved in satanic cult investigation 
has found a correlation between the high days of a satanic 
calendar and increased incidence of missing children. 
David Poulton, a retired federal policeman who has been 
investigating cults for 15 years and has interviewed 200 
people, either cult victims or participants, says there are 
many covens, a high degree of child abuse, children abused 
with alcohol and drugs, and many child sacrifices. 
Children £jre kidnapped, babies bom into covens, their 
demise needing no death certificate because their birth is 
never registered. A north coast clergyman and former 
military intelligence officer independently confirmed this 
view, though he stresses people should not become 
paranoid, but be on guard. Of society's scepticism he said: 
"How does a two-year-old describe fellatio? You might say 
one child had a vivid imagination, but when there are five 
children in one group, ten more in Holland and five in 
Belgium, any rational thinking person would say we must 
act to protect them."
To say it is one thing. To act quite another. Abused children 
are regularly denied justice in Australia's courts and a 
successful case has yet to be mounted fo prosecute the 
occult criminal. Indeed, the idea of a successful prosecu­
tion of ritual abusers is almost a contradiction in terms, 
given the difficulty of collating, accepting and presenting 
child testimony, the absence of eye-witness to the crime, 
the cleverness of the criminals, the terrorisation of the 
victims , and the fact that it is easier to turn victim into 
villain fabricating falsehoods than to take his or her word. 
Above all is the inappropriateness of the adversarial court 
system for hearing these cases.
The very language of the court militates against the abused 
child. A study conducted by Mark and Roslin Brennan of 
the Riverina Literacy Centre in Wagga reports that "the 
language barrier is being exploited for the benefit of the 
defendant rather than safeguarding ways in which 
children can best express their knowledge and under­
standing of what is happening to them". Defence lawyers 
use tactics to undermine child witnesses during cross ex­
amination. Judges dismiss charges after arbitrary tests of 
a child's competence to understand truth from falsehood. 
Do you know what perjury means, they ask a ten-year-old, 
when most adults would be hard pressed to define an 
acceptable answer in the intimidating atmosphere of the 
courtroom.
The Brennans report a nine-year-old who was asked by a 
defence counsel: "Well I know, I understand that you say 
you have been talking to her today but you see what I am 
asking you is this, that statement suggests that you said 
those things that you now say are wrong to the police. Now 
did you say it to the police or did you not?" The befuddled 
child, not surprisingly, answered: "I don't know." The 
study concludes that children are not used to questions
being asked with the idea in mind that their responses can 
be manipulated for someone else's benefit, and that the 
someone else is the alleged offender.
How much more difficult for a child to appear a credible 
witness when his or her testimony alleges being forced to 
eat excrement or cat food, or seeing a baby killed or a live 
chicken have its legs and wings cut off, or being anally 
penetrated by a man wearing a black pointed hood, or lain 
on an altar and forced to have oral sex. It takes enormous 
courage for the terrorised child to tell at all. The problem 
is not, writes Beatrix Campbell, "that the stranger in the 
park is being resurrected in a new moral panic."
“How to credit that adults 
dress up and practise 
arcane and brutal 
ceremonies in this age ."
"The problem is that unless and until some communal 
resistance is mobilised on the side of children and their 
advocates then their disclosures will always be dis­
avowed."
As things stand, satanic rituals in a secular culture like 
Australia's are not taken seriously, and anyone who 
respects children's accounts of satanic or ritualised abuse 
are not taken seriously, either. There are special police 
investigating units, and glossy manuals of advice on child 
abuse investigation and management; evidence is accumu­
lated and concern expressed. In fact, there should be a 
social outcry that these things are being done to our 
children, for at the self-interest level alone, they are storing 
up problems for the future at which we can only guess. But 
aU too often, as Campbell says, the cries for help are not 
heeded. Any outcry there is tends to come from male 
columnists who warn, not against the terrorisation and 
brutalisation of our next generation, but against "witch­
hunts" which are only too ready to see "a male conspiracy 
to abuse the female, with every man guilty until proved 
innocent (preferably by castration)".
YVONNE PRESTON is a senior journalist with the Sydney 
Morning Herald. She began her second stint as that paper's 
Beijing correspondent last month.
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Farewell to the
SWEDISH 
MODEL
Sweden was the exemvlarfor the thinking labour 
movement in the 80s. Now, it seems, the model's come 
apart at the seams. Andrew Vandenbergand G eoff 
Dow observe the rise of economic austerity, Swedish style.
T
he last 12 months have not been good 
for Sweden's Social Democratic Party 
(SAP). In February, the government 
resigned after failing to obtain support 
in the riksdag (parliam ent) for a series of 
measures ostensibly designed to control infla­
tion but which included a proposal to prohibit 
industrial action among public sector unions. 
Support for these measures had been garnered 
from the trade union leadership— to the surprise 
and consternation of those who recognised the 
departure from Swedish policy-making tradi­
tions. After a few weeks, the government was 
re in sta ted , w ith a d ifferen t treasu rer and 
diminished credibility.
When the party commenced its September 1990 congress, 
its self-proclaimed task was to convince itself that it had 
the vision and administrative acumen to guide the country 
and social democracy in the decade ahead. Party officials 
had prepared not only a platform but a much more sub­
stantial Program for the Nineties. This 285-page document
purports to be as important as the 1944 Post War Program 
associated largely with Ernst Wigforss and Alva and Gun- 
nar Myrdal, which legitimated the "industrial efficiency 
through social security" model that has since characterised 
the Swedish welfare state. Complete with quotations from 
Socrates, the program reiterates the labour movement's 
commitment to equality, full employment and collectivism 
and includes a detailed discussion of environmental, 
worklife, public sector and economic policy issues.
Despite the congress atmosphere, including red banners 
and a final rendition of The Internationale in Stockholm’s 
Folketshus, the party failed to convince an increasingly 
hostile electorate or its increasingly disillusioned trade- 
union wing that it understands 'the Swedish model'.
The February crisis had an even more austere sequel in 
October. The government now seems willing to adopt the 
orthodox measures urged upon them by employers, the 
OECD and many of their own economic advisers. These 
emphatic policy reversals were quite unheralded at the 
party congress a month earlier. With hindsight it is ap­
parent that they must have been long contemplated by the 
leadership group.
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Paralleling the changes in post-Cold War Europe, Sweden 
is recharting its political and economic course towards an 
orthodox conformity with the world economy. The 
government's policies in recent years mirror the interna­
tional trend towards liberalisation, deregulation, 
decentralisation and competition.
Publicly, SAP politicians continue to proclaim a commit­
ment to full employment and equality, but the trade union 
movement is concerned that full employment and social 
welfare might be sacrificed in the near future. The party 
has departed from its former preparedness to guarantee, 
via institutions, high levels of economic activity, and there­
fore low levels of inequality. The industrial sector now 
predicts (or threatens) unemployment of 4% or more as it 
reorients its operations towards the new Europe. The 
government has announced a definite intention to seek 
membership of the EEC. It is presenting this, and the 
Introduction of competition into the social welfare delivery 
system, as indications of its decisiveness, realism and 
flexibility. For the unions, the break-up of centralised wage 
negotiation forums, employer recalcitrance and the loss of 
influence on government policy represent a new political 
dimate.
Domestic conditions in Sweden have become much less 
conducive to an exceptional set of standards and expecta­
tions than they were even as late as the 1970s. The Social 
Democrats, who have governed for 52 of the last 58 years, 
lag seriously in opinion polls. Even worse, the party has 
lost its inclination to contemplate distinctive programs of 
socialist reform, preferring to steer the party platform 
towards conventionality. Conservative voices, particularly 
theinfluentialand aggressive employers' federation (SAF), 
have managed to seize the initiative in public debate from 
the social democrats and the trade unions. Such changes 
have occurred in the past five years or so after several 
decades of unusually coherent policy development by the 
labour movement which successfully combined high 
material standards with distributive equity.
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Social democrats should be aware from history that a 
commitment to permanent full employment may provoke 
reaction and opposition, yet the politicians have been con­
tent to mouth slogans without discernible concern for their 
institutional requirements. Disappointment of supporters' 
expectations by mass parties of the Left is, of course, not a 
uniquely Swedish phenomenon, but the recent disregard 
of non-inflationary full employment has still angered 
many in the party, especially those like Gosta Rehn and 
Rudolf Meidner who have spent most of their adult lives 
refining a social democratic policy model which worked 
without resorting to repression or deflation.
Very little discussion of principles occurred at the party's 
congress. Instead, debate concentrated on several specific, 
controversial policy issues. The congress dismissed recom­
mendations by the party executive on visits by nuclear­
armed warships; it amended the executive's suggestions 
to adopt only vague compromise resolutions on childcare 
and on the dismantling of nuclear power; and it gave the 
leadership an open mandate to settle the controversies 
over advertising on broadcast television, over a bridge 
instead of a tunnel to Denmark and, perhaps most impor­
tant of all, over membership of the European Community.
It is difficult to explain entirely the motivation and pres­
sures behind this change of direction. Is the pertinent 
question: why have the Swedish Social Democrats 
abrogated past commitments? Or is it: why have neo­
liberal ideas had such an impact on policy-making since 
the mid-1970&—first in the Anglo-saxon countriesand now 
in Scandinavia? How do we explain the paradoxical 
propensity of contemporary government to produce 
policies that systematically undermine national economic 
capacity, while threatening in the process their own elec­
toral survival? There is, after all, plenty of evidence that 
domestic policy priorities can affect domestic outcomes, 
for good or ill, regardless of what is happening in the 
international sphere. Sweden is not the only source of this 
evidence. There seems to be both more narrow political and 
broader structural forces at work.
In Sweden the immediate reasons for what seem to be 
recent reversals of an effective model is the unexpected 
influence of conservative academic, governmental and in­
ternational economists. Corporate pressure to join the 
European Community has been especially strident, chal­
lenging even the country's long-standing tradition of 
neutrality. Organisations like Volvo and L M Ericsson now 
employ more workers outside Sweden than inside and 
have lost the commitment they once had to a strong or 
stable Swedish domestic economy. They would be happy 
to shift production to Belgium or Brazil and rarely miss an 
opportunity to remind the government that social 
democratic health, employment and workplace standards 
exceed those in other locations.
Politically, the employers' new strategy is to eliminate 
what remains of a distinctive model in Sweden by refusing 
to engage in any form of policy co-ordination with the 
unions or the government. The central employer organisa­
tion (SAF) is even closing down its research apparatus and 
disposing of the data once used for wage bargaining. An
altered domestic strategy is therefore being forged in the 
context of the increased internationalisation of the world 
economy, and the government's recent machinations 
reflect this new situation.
The labour movement's own strategy has been faltering 
for at least 20 years and perhaps, as Winton Higgins has 
maintained, since the 1950s. There has been little ideologi­
cal leadership—and certainly none to match Ernst 
Wigforss' reformist marxism—since the 1970s. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the first generation of trade union economists 
were responsible for policies and institutions like the Na­
tional Labour Market Board (AMS) for dealing with infla­
tion, unemployment and wage solidarity problems. Since 
then, too little attention has been paid to the slowly fester­
ing tensions between the party and the movement on 
implementation of distinctive economic policies.
A major failure has been the under-development of in­
dustry and investment policy in Sweden which, as a result, 
is dangerously reliant on about 100 export-oriented en­
gineering firms. Selective interventionism has operated in 
principle, especially with respect to employment policy, 
but investment and product development decisions are 
still made outside of public policy and with little regard to 
the national interest.
It is always difficult for leftist politicians to ignore the 
mainstream of policy advice and to pursue experimental 
policies opposed by the entire professional orthodoxy of 
economists. To do so involves the construction of an 'alter­
native accumulation strategy'—which, in turn, means an 
entirely different pattern of institutional power and con­
flict. Swedish Social Democrats showed themselves, 
during the wage-eamer funds campaign, to be unequal to 
such a struggle. During 1990 they lost whatever residual 
credibility they retained after their earlier routing by the 
employers.
By tradition, the SAPleaders take a strong interest in social 
democratic ideology. During a very polarised 1982 election 
campaign dominated by the wage earner funds issue 
former leader Olof Palme proclaimed, "Yes, I'm a 
democratic socialist". But to the same question, the leader 
and prime minister since 1986, Ingvar Carlsson, sub­
sequently responded, "I'm a social democrat and that's 
enough for me”.
In the party's theoretical journal Tiden and again in one of 
his three major congress speeches, Carlsson has tried to put 
his own stamp on the party's ideology by arguing that | 
social democracy cannot be regarded, fundamentally, as a 
matter of public administration and economic regulation. I 
It must be a system of values: freedom, equality, fraternity 
and solidarity.
An eyebrow or two was raised at the congress when 
Carlsson attacked "the true believers, the supposedly real 
socialists'’ . "Early on," he argued, "the social democrats j 
realised that it was not who owned but who controlled the 
means of production that was decisive." He argued, there- | 
fore, that control over production has been constrained by j 
legislation, a strong trade union movement and economic
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policy. This view of a gradual expansion of democratic 
influence over the private owners of capital makes the SAP 
indistinguishable from the Swedish liberals; it is indicative 
of the party's apparent renunciation of a distinctive profile. 
Carisson's view of social democracy is also at odds with 
the more explicitly socialist ambitions developed by the 
SAP-affiliated Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) in the 
mid-1970s.
The LCy s democratic socialism evolved independently of 
the SAFs ideology during the 1950s and 1960s. A distinct 
LO position crystallised in 1976 when the union 
economists presented their wage earner funds proposal. 
The LO's argument was that ownership of capital could 
not be ignored by a movement trying to take a responsible 
approach to macroeconomic conditions. Collective owner­
ship would change the unequal distribution of wealth and 
income, the anti-social and anti-democratic organisation of 
production and the chronic instability of economic activity. 
This stance challenged employers'rights to such an extent 
that they began a campaign to dismantle the Swedish 
model.
Whereas Palme tolerated some inconsistencies between 
the SAP's rhetoric and its actual policies, Carlsson and his 
confidants have sought greater correspondence between 
the government's actions and the party's ideology—per­
haps to appease the business community internationally. 
But the Prime Minister's arguments against trade-offs be­
tween freedom, equality and efficiency do stake out a 
strong rhetorical position opposed to liberals—perhaps 
largely for the sake of quelling disquiet in the ranks.
The party's failure of resolve has arisen at a time when a 
number of independent issues have forced themselves 
onto the political agenda. While not uncontroversial, these 
are not at the core of social democracy. Nonetheless, how 
they are being handled by the party is affecting the way in 
which the government itself is able to define and redefine 
broader ideological matters.
The labour movement is deeply divided, for example, on 
the issue of nuclear power. By obligation to its members in 
the energy-intensive forestry and paper mill industries, the 
LO is wary of the government's sympathy for calls to close 
all 13 existing nuclear power plants by 2010. In 1985, after 
Chernobyl, the government declared that the closures 
should be completed by 2010 and that the oldest plants 
would cease operation by about 1995. Furthermore, the 
government also undertook not to allow any increase in 
the country's dependence on imported oil and gas, any 
increase in carbon dioxide pollution, or the damming of 
the last two wild rivers in the country.
A few days before the Gulf war started, the prime minister 
and the leaders of the liberal and centre parties announced 
that they had reached a compromise on the vexed issue of 
when tostait closing down the nuclear power plants. They 
agreed on greater spending for research into alternative 
energy sources and they agreed that—one way or 
another—Swedish electricity prices must retain parity 
with international prices. The details disappeared, of 
course, in the flood of dramatic war news so it is difficult
to gauge whether the issue has gone into hibernation or 
whether voters and unionists worried about their jobs will 
support the government for its decisiveness.
Important divisions remain too in a policy arena which has 
become a crucial indicator of the social democrats' commit­
ment to the "folkhem''—a powerful and longstanding 
image of the welfare state as 'the people's home'. Parental 
leave and childcare are important parts of the Swedish 
welfare system that have been somewhat mishandled by 
the SAP recently. In 1985, the government promised 
childcare places ("dagis") for all by 1991, However, 
Sweden's birth rate has jumped to the highest in the West 
and female participation in the labour market continues to 
increase. Chronic shortages of trained personnel in the 
major cities as well as local government budget constraints 
frustrated the high expectations.
The SAP originally promised to solve the problem of 
childcare by extending the system of public insurance for 
parental leave from work. After a volte-face, the govern­
ment eventually decided to lower the school-entry age, 
transfer seven-year-olds from the dagis to the schools and 
so create sufficient places for one and two-year-olds.
Notwithstanding this rather clever solution, the debate 
over childcare seems to indicate a reluctance by social 
democracy to continue the process of socialising family 
responsibilities. The issue should have been an easy one 
for Swedish Social Democrats to resolve: they have, after 
all, an enviable record on women's wages women's par­
ticipation in the workforce and the extension of societal 
responsibility for care of the elderly and children. The 
upshot of the prolonged party debate and tensions be­
tween central and local governments (which provide most 
welfare and childcare services) is that electorally sig­
nificant numbers of working parents have been provided 
with ready access to high quality day care centres. But there 
is also a lingering distrust about the social democrats' 
willingness or ability to honour election promises.
Despite all the policy preoccupations of the moment, the 
integrity of the social democratic model stands or falls on 
its claims to have a distinctive and successful approach to 
industry and the economy. It is now possible to argue that 
economic rationalism has affected economic policy* 
making in Sweden in a way that permanently impairs 
social democratic arrangements. Kjell-Olof Feldt is no 
longer treasurer, but his endeavour to purge the party of 
what he saw as its ideological anachronistic sacred cows 
continues.
What has differentiated the Swedish approach to full 
employment and equality from lip-service acceptance of 
similar goals by labour parties in the Anglo-saxon world 
has been the Swedes' preparedness and ability to translate 
the ideals into effective policies and institutions. The dif­
ficulty of the struggle, over many decades, makes the Social 
Democrats' current retreats all the more disheartening.
Inequalities of income always happen in times of un­
employment and it is at such times that orthodox economic 
advice can readily stampede governments into contradic­
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tory policy positions which only make things worse. Full 
employment demamds what Ernst Wigforss, social 
democratic activist from 1904 to 1974 and treasurer (1926, 
1932-49) referred to as'open-ended intervention'. In prac­
tice, this meant counter-cyclical macro-economic policies 
in the 1930s, separate institutions to facilitate relocation or 
retraining of displaced employees in the 1950s, and a 
commitment by the trade unions to organised restructur­
ing of the economy all through the post-war period.
Swedish economic policy would never have become a 
'model' if the highly unionised and centrally organised 
workforce had not been so influential in economic policy 
debates. Veteran strategists Rehn and Meidner still figure 
prominently, though joylessly, in discussions on how to 
secure full employment without inflation. Their efforts led 
to the unions' adoption in the late 1950s of a 'wages policy 
of solidarity'. Uniform increases, calculated by reference to 
the profitability of firms in the most profitable sector, were 
to be paid to all workers according to the principle 'equal 
pay for equal work'. Firms with a low capacity to pay 
would be forced out of business. Profitable firms, whose 
workforce exercised considerable 'market restraint' in 
wage negotiations, were to prosper and so provide a 
private market impetus to structural change. Employers 
participated in these arrangements in order to avert 
government involvement in incomes policy and to reduce 
the strike rate.
The Rehn-Meidner model was successful in producing an 
efficient private sector and distributive equality because 
unions were able to insist that the government adopt sup­
portive social welfare policies and establish institutions in 
the employment and industrial relations arenas. Essential, 
too, are the high taxes and the associated non-discretionary 
incomes which have been able, especially since the 1970s, 
to 'decommodify' (that is, disentangle from market de­
pendence) many of the services that contribute to Swedes' 
living standards.
The 'Swedish model' should therefore be characterised as 
social welfare universalism—that is, generous entitle­
ments to all citizens, not just the needy— and specific, 
selective, interventions in the economy. Its opposite is the 
' Anglo-saxon model': targeted and discriminatory welfare 
supports with indiscriminate assistance to industry usual­
ly unrelated to performance.
Employers since the 1970s they have undermined the 
central elements of the Swedish model. For example, they 
have used the profit windfalls they secured as a result of 
the 1982 devaluation to bid up wages for highly skilled on 
highly favoured workers. There is now a worrying profit- 
led, wage-drift inflation of around 10%. SAF has changed 
its function, since the wage-earner funds campaign, from 
an industrial relations negotiating body toan anti-socialist 
propaganda machine.
Public scepticism about the Social Democrats' economic 
policy performance derives as much from internal labour 
movement squabbles as from the highly publicised break­
down of the centralised negotiation processes. In response 
to complaints from employers that Swedish wage and
employment conditions cost too much, and to their threats 
to reinvest, or even relocate, elsewhere in Europe, LO has 
recently advocated successive currency devaluation to re­
store competitiveness for Swedish-based producers. 
Trea surer Larsson then accused the LO economists of aban­
doning the fight against inflation. This was ironic, since it 
was LO that had given the slogan 'hate inflation' consid­
erable prominence in the 1950s. The government position 
is now to urge, in threatening tones, 'the labour market 
partners' to accept responsibility for stabilisation but 
without a supporting wages policy. This situation led, in 
December 1990, to a stinging public attack by LO's chair­
person Stig Malm on the government's approach in 
general and on the treasurer in particular. Malm was forced 
to apologise but then received criticism from within the 
unions for his apparent accession to the government view.
The employers pointedly abstain from any discussion, let 
alone binding agreement, with LO. So they reap instead 
the propaganda rewards that accrue from their own non­
involvement. LO's authority is weakening as many of its 
constituent unions and their members are wooed away 
from centrally decreed restraints by employers' in­
dividualised offers. Subsequent demands for catch-up in­
creases from other employees then exacerbate the 
problems that any solidarity wage policy must address. 
The unions know that pronouncements they might make 
along these lines would be ineffective because, given high 
profits, individual employees can easily bargain for in­
dividual wage increases and ignore their own organisa­
tions.
The impossibility of expecting unions to bear respon­
sibility for profit-led inflation is precisely the 'old problem' 
that Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner addressed in the 
1950s. It has returned in the 1980sand 1990s partly because 
the government failed to implement the 'profit squeeze' 
aspects of the model even in its heyday and partly because 
the government's acceptance of a distinctive approach to 
economic stabilisation has always lagged behind the LO1 s.
It should be remembered that most of these problems due 
to the departure of Swedish policy from the Swedish 
model not because it is following the model. Policy never 
has followed the model, completely. As Rudolf Meidner 
recently said: it always was difficult, there always was 
internal conflict, the party always held back public debate. 
Perhaps there needs to be a period of electoral opposition 
before LO is able to reassert itself; but it seems unlikely that 
Ingvar Carlsson's command of social democratic principle 
is sufficient to allow him to avert the slide towards 
liberalism and impending electoral loss. Full employment 
remains a genuine achievement in Sweden, but there are 
few left who remember how it was done.
The farce has become tragic because there was once a 
coherent alternative to economists' cynicism: it was called 
the Swedish model.
ANDREW VANDENBERG has lived In Stockholm since 
1984, where he researched his doctoral thesis. GEOFF DOW 
is on leave from the University of Queensland, researching 
Sweden's social democratic economic policies.
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Sovereign
DESIRES
Self-determination has been at the heart of Aboriginal 
aspirations. As a slogan, it echoes through the twentieth 
century. But Garth Nettheim argues that sovereignty is 
rarely defined, and often misunderstood.
he term 'sovereignty' has several tech­
nical legal meanings as well as a less 
specific general or political meaning. 
When aboriginal people in Australia, 
or elsewhere, assert their sovereignty they may 
be using the phrase in either a legal or a political 
sense or in a sense that represents some amalgam 
of the two. Communication becomes difficult if 
those attempting dialogue use words in different 
senses. The same sort of problems beset refer­
ences to 'treaties' and discussions about the claim 
of indigenous peoples to 'self-determination'. 
These problems arise in debates about law and 
policy, at the national and the international 
levels.
Peoples have been encroaching on other peoples' ter­
ritories for millenia but it is perhaps sufficient to go back 
only 500 years to the rise of the modem state, the begin­
nings of European colonial expansion—1992 marks the 
500th anniversary of Columbus' 'discovery' of 'The New 
World'—and the birth of modem international law.
Themes emerged five centuries ago about the relationships 
between colonisers and indigenous peoples that continue
to resound today. Satisfactory resolution seems as elusive 
today as then.
The fundamental question is, inevitably, by what right a 
people from one land take over territories occupied by 
other peoples. In modem international law such conduct 
is clearly unlawful in terms of the United Nations Charter, 
Article 2(4), which states:
All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.
While this prohibition has been honoured more in the 
breach than in the observance, it is the basis for the UN 
Security Council's response to Iraq's takeover of Kuwait. 
However, in earlier centuries colonial expansion was a 
matter of "might is right", and any international disputa­
tion tended to revolve only around the question of which 
European power had the superior right to colonise a par­
ticular territory and its people. Nonetheless, questions of 
moral and legal entitlement were always present, even 
within the colonial power.
In a period of colonial expansion there is no shortage of 
people ready to find justifications. The sheer self-interest 
in the acquisition of territory and resources may be dressed
T
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up in references to the Christian mission of conversion. 
This will often be linked with a denigration of the existing 
inhabitants. Such a denigration of the colonised peoples 
may refer to their 'primitive' forms of land use compared 
to such 'advanced' practices as cultivation or forest 
clearance or mining. It may refer to 'barbaric' or simply 
non-Christian beliefs or practices. It is not only Christians 
who may denigrate those of other faiths and lifestyles, as 
can be seen in more recent non-European examples of 
imperial expansion in places such as Tibet, West Papua and 
East Timor.
The classic debate along these lines took place in 1550-1551. 
The Valladolid disputation was convened by King Charles 
V of Spain and the Council of the Indies in an attempt to 
resolve the continuing contention within Spain over the 
morality and legality of the wars of conquest against the 
Indians. The case for the colonialists was presented by Juan 
Gines de Sepulveda. The case for the Indianists was 
presented by Bartolome de las Casas. Las Casas refuted 
Sepulveda’s several justifications for conquest and insisted 
that the political and legal sovereignty and jurisdiction of 
the Indian nations had to be respected. He was not, of 
course, successful in averting the impact of Spanish 
colonialism, but his writings (and those of his contem­
porary, Francisco de Vitoria) represent a strand in thinking
in international law from that early period which is of 
continuing relevance in debates about sovereignty, self- 
determination and indigenous rights today. In particular, 
the colonialist device of denigrating the colonised was 
strongly repudiated.
Denigration may go even further. It may extend to denying 
the inhabitants the status of occupiers of the land. Hence 
the statements, common in European juristic writings of 
the 17th and 18th centuries, that peoples such as hunter- 
gfitherers who neither till the soil nor live in settled villages, 
do not 'occupy' or 'possess' the land at all, but simply 
wander across it. However, the practice of European States, 
including Britain, during this period was to acknowledge 
the political status of indigenous peoples and to negotiate 
treaties to regulate their relationships with them.
Cook's instructions from the Admiralty were that he 
should obtain "the consent of the natives', if there be any, 
to establish "convenient stations". But discussions about 
Australia in the period between Cook's first voyage and 
the departure of the First Fleet proceeded to a large extent 
on the belief that Australia was literally uninhabited. Sir 
Joseph Banks' testimony to the House of Commons' Select 
Committee on Transportation surmised that there were 
thin populations on the eastern coastline but that the inte­
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nor was quite empty. On the basis of this misinformation, 
and also on the basis of notions of cultural superiority, the 
English treated the land as terra nullius—land belonging 
to no one—and regarded themselves as entitled to take 
over the territory and to settle the land without regard to 
any rights of the prior inhabitants. The contrast with con­
temporaneous British policy in North America, New 
Zealand and elsewhere was quite marked.
Soon after settlement in Australia, it- became quite clear 
that all parts of the country were in fact populated, and 
that particular peoples had very strong attachments to 
particular territories—sufficiently strong to induce them 
to engage in prolonged guerrilla warfare in their defence. 
By the 1830s the British Colonial Office deemed it ap­
propriate to recognise prior Aboriginal rights, specifically 
in regard to the settlement of South Australia, but it proved 
too late in the day to alter the assumptions and practices 
of the colonies themselves.
By the middle and later 19th century, European justifica­
tions for colonialism and the denigration of indigenous 
peoples were reaching their most extreme form. Even in 
the lands where treaties had been negotiated, the fortunes 
of the indigenous people were little better than in 
Australia. In the United States, Canada and New Zealand 
indigenous peoples argue that their pre-existing rights and 
their treaty rights have been ignored or eroded by the 
settler societies, and they continue to press claims in terms 
of sovereignty, self-determination and self-government.
Increasingly, governments in these several countries are 
beginning to acknowledge the proposition advanced four 
and a half centuries ago by Las Casas, that the relationship 
between colonising peoples and indigenous peoples has to 
be perceived in political-legal terms. There are, in addition, 
moves (also echoing Las Casas but currently resisted by 
national governments) towards treating the relationship as 
one to be defined by international law.
By the early part of the 20th century a Eurocentric concep­
tion had evolved which perceived international law as 
concerned almost exclusively with the mutual rights and 
obligations of States and their governments. The States 
themselves seldom coincided with peoples or nations but 
frequently divided them, or grouped various nations and 
peoples within their borders. How the governments of 
those States dealt with their own subject peoples was 
regarded, with few exceptions, as of no concern to interna­
tional law.
Since the end of World War Two the scope of international 
law has dramatically broadened to incorporate a concept 
of human rights. The Charter of the United Nations, in 
Article 1, defines the purposes of the organisation as in­
cluding not only the maintenance of international peace 
and security but also respect for equal rights and self-deter­
mination of peoples as conducive to friendly relations 
among nations and "promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion...". 
The subsequent development of international law on 
human rights has been through such instruments as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a series of 
treaties, conventions and covenants ratified by the govern­
ments of many states.
These new international standards, together with the (still 
rudimentary) implementation procedures, have been of 
value in addressing some of the claims of indigenous 
peoples, but not all of them. In particular, international 
human rights law has proved inadequate to meet 'group' 
or 'collective' claims advanced by indigenous peoples in 
respect of culture, territory and autonomy, particularly the 
autonomy claims. The term 'autonomy' here refers to any 
sort of status under which a people have effective political 
control over the matters that concern them. The word 
'sovereignty' is sometimes used in this popular sense.
Whatever popular meaning that the term 'sovereignty' 
may have had or may still have, it now has a quite technical 
meaning in international law as denoting
...the basic international legal status of a State that 
is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to 
the governmental, executive, legislative, or judi­
cial jurisdiction of a foreign State or to foreign law 
other than public international law.1
Within contemporary international relations the govern­
ment of the Commonwealth of Australia is regarded as 
having sovereignty, in relation to other sovereign States. 
Can a rival or competing sovereignty in this specific legal 
sense be claimed on behalf of Australia's indigenous 
peoples? Such a claim was argued in Coe v Commonwealth 
(1979) but the High Court held that such a proposition was 
not arguable. Justice Jacobs pointed out that such issues
...are not matters of municipal [ie, national] law 
but of the law of nations [ie, international law] and 
are not cognisable in a court exercising jurisdic­
tion under that sovereignty which is sought to be 
challenged.
Can such a claim be argued in the International Court of 
Justice? The problem here is that to be entitled to argue a 
case in that court you have, generally speaking, to be a 
State. Hence, a classic "Catch 22": the only forum that may 
adjudicate whether you are a sovereign State requires, 
before it even listens to you, that you be a sovereign State! 
There are slightly better prospects to argue a non-rival 
sovereignty or sovereignties within the overall 
sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Australia. Indeed, 
the notion is already familiar within our federal system in 
which the six states claim to be sovereign entities, subject 
to the Commonwealth Constitution.
United States law has long acknowledged a subordinate 
sovereignty in individual Indian nations in terms first 
articulated in the 1820s and 1830s by Chief Justice Mar­
shall. They are subject to the authority of the United States 
government but they have a right of internal self-govem- 
ment and a degree of sovereign immunity, especially with 
regard to matters arising on Indian lands.
In New Zealand, Maori argue that the proper interpreta­
tion of the 2nd Article of the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840,
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preserves internal sovereignty or self-government to the 
Maori. In Australia a similar proposition has most fre­
quently taken the form of claims for a degree of immunity 
from the jurisdiction of settler courts. Such claims have 
been asserted since the early years of European settlement. 
While some courts were ready to accept such arguments 
(eg Willis J in Bonjon) the view that has generally prevailed 
has been that of the Full Supreme Court of New South 
Wales in R v Murrell (1836), followed in R v Wedge (1976), 
that Aboriginal people were fully subject to the introduced 
legal system. But the issue continues to be raised.
The word 'treaty' is another term that once had a quite 
general meaning which included any sort of agreement. In 
modem times, however, these other usages have come to 
be regarded as obsolete and the term is confined to formal 
agreement between two or more independent States. It 
could be argued that the act of a colonising government in 
concluding a treaty with an indigenous nation represents 
an acknowledgment of the independent status of such 
indigenous nation, of its legal capacity to enter into such 
an agreement and, hence, of its sovereignty. Many of the 
earlier North American treaties, for example, took the form 
of treaties for peace and friendship, for alliance, or for 
trade, and dearly acknowledged not only the capacity of 
the indigenous nation to enter the treaty but also the con­
tinuation thereafter of that independent nation status.
However, the treaties characteristic of the 19th and 20th 
centuries made provision for non-indigenous land settle­
ment and for governmental rights of the colonising power. 
If the act of entering such a treaty was an exercise of 
sovereign power, was the effect of the treaty to relinquish 
sovereignty? The critical fact is that such treaties nave 
fallen to be interpreted by the courts of the settler society, 
and the clear trend has been to deny such treaties any 
international status whatsoever, ie. one party to the agree­
ment has used its institutions to restrict the original mean­
ing, as understood by the indigenous nation. This hasbeen 
the pattern in the United States, in Canada, and in New 
Zealand. In Australia, where treaties have been con­
spicuously absent, modern proposals to negotiate some 
sort of instrument of reconciliation have tended to avoid 
any use of the word 'treaty' (though Prime Minister Hawke 
has not hesitated, on occasion, to use the term).
Self-determination is a relatively modem concept in inter­
national law, though only in the sense that it connotes the 
right to recover political autonomy; conceptually, it is clear­
ly linked with much older principles that peoples ought 
not to be deprived of such autonomy.
The right of self-determination finds expression in the 
Charter of the United Nations and in the two International 
Covenants that developed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights into treaty form: the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both 
Covenants have an identical Article 1 which commences:
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All peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development....
This was the primary basis, especially after 1960, for the 
massive process of decolonisation, presided over by the 
UN's Decolonisation Committee, whereby former 
European colonies in Asia, Africa and elsewhere progres­
sively achieved independence as sovereign States. But one 
major category of colonised people who have not enjoyed 
the benefits of decolonisation are those indigenous peoples 
subordinated within the borders of independent States. 
United Nations practice has been to confine the right to 
self-determination to people in the 'classic7 colonial context 
of governance from a distant European power. Anything 
beyond that is perceived as a potential threat to the ter­
ritorial integrity of established States.
That threat has been overstated because, in the heyday of 
Third World decolonisation, 'self-determination' came to 
be regarded as virtually synonymous with 'inde­
pendence'. But 'self-determination' is a process; it does not 
necessarily indicate one particular outcome of that process, 
independence. It contemplates the right of a "people" to 
make a free choice about their political-legal relationship 
with a State. A variety of relationships may be possible 
which meet the legitimate needs of the indigenous people 
ranging from full integration, at one end of the spectrum, 
to full independence, at the other. The latter may be politi­
cally unachievable in many cases, and certainly faces major 
political difficulties in Australia. But a variety of other 
forms of autonomy may be achievable within the overall 
sovereignty of the State. It is quite likely that the future will 
see some creative development of the concept of self-deter­
mination in a way that may serve to meet the aspirations 
of many indigenous peoples.
In many States where indigenous peoples have been 
colonised, the settler society has attempted to deal with 
them in a variety of ways. Extermination has been tried, 
and the more modem techniques of destruction of habitat 
or relocation have similar consequences. Assimilation has 
often been pursued, generally without success. Govern­
ments have frequentlysjreated the problems of mar­
ginalised indigenous peoples as problems of welfare, to be 
dealt with by funds and programs and bureaucrats—also 
usually without success. The application of human rights 
standards, nationally and internationally, has produced 
some benefits, but problems persist in the relationship 
between the indigenous people and the settler society. 
National governments are beginning to acknowledge that 
the issues have to be addressed in fundamental terms that 
go to the legal and political basis of that relationship.
This became evident in Canada in the 1982 "con- 
stitutionalisation" of aboriginal and treaty rights and in the 
subsequent attempt, through a series of First Ministers' 
Conferences, to define an aboriginal right of self-govern­
ment. It emerged in New Zealand with the statutory un­
derpinning, since 1975, of the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal as a forum for 
hearing Maori claims. It has even been evident in Australia 
in discussion about a treaty or makarrata or instrument of
reconciliation and in some of the rhetoric about the new 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC). All these governments, however, continue to 
view the relationship as one which is to be defined as a 
matter of national law so as to leave the peoples ultimately 
at the mercy of national governments.
Indigenous peoples are arguing strongly that their 
relationship to the enveloping State should be treated as a 
matter of international law. The principal forum in which 
such claims are being developed is the United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations which, since 
its establishment in 1982, has opened its deliberations to 
indigenous peoples from around the world. The working 
group is in the process of drafting a Universal Declaration 
on Indigenous Rights. The current draft contains a number 
of strong statements about the right of indigenous peoples 
to self-determination even if within the context of a non- 
indigenous State. Indigenous claims of this nature are 
unlikely to be completely palatable to States, but it is quite 
feasible that international law may well develop to the 
point where there are reasonably firm standards to meet 
indigenous aspirations, together with some form of inter; 
national monitoring of State conduct.
For some indigenous peoples such developments will be 
insufficient. They will continue to seek full decolonisation 
and recognition of their independent nationhood. The 
people of East Timor, for example, have shown their per­
sistence in resisting the recent substitution of a new In­
donesian colonisation for an ancient and retreating 
Portuguese colo'nialism. The Six Nation Iroquois Con­
federacy in North America has continually asserted its 
international sovereign status.
For Australia's indigenous peoples, the Torres Strait Is­
landers may have a stronger chance of achieving inde­
pendence through existing decolonisation arrangements 
(which are, arguably, too restrictive), being geographically 
separate from Australia and having been subject to rela­
tively minor non-Islander settlement. For mainland 
Aboriginal peoples, however, achievement of a complete, 
independent sovereignty faces considerable political and 
procedural problems. But some measure of sovereignty in 
a popular sense, some degree of self-determination and 
self-government, is not only feasible, it is essential for the 
recovery of Aboriginal communities from the impact of 
two centuries of continuing colonisation.
It will take a major act of creative statesmanship for 
Australian governments to sit down with representatives 
of the indigenous peoples in an attempt to negotiate a 
redefinition of the political and legal basis of the relation­
ship. But without such an attempt the relationship will 
continue to cause grave difficulties for the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples and, indeed, to Australian 
society as a whole.
GARTH NETTHEIM is professor of law at the University of 
NSW.
1. Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol 10 (North 
Holland, Amsterdam, 1987), 297 at 408.
ALR: MARCH 1991
MATTERS ARISING 37
John Bell as Shylock. Merchant o f Venice
John Bell's new Shakespeare company aims to 
unite the Bard and Australian idiom. But 
Jerem y Eccles asks whether the theatre 
industry is really up to a populist Hamlet.
t a time of confused 
d irectio n  in the  
Australian arts, the ar­
rival of a new, half-a- 
million-dollar theatre company 
devoted to the w orks of  
Shakespeare has not been  
received with unfettered en­
thusiasm.
Is the Bell Shakespeare Company part 
of a retreat from the commitment by 
major theatre companies putting on 
50% or so local product when there's 
little new writing—and when the 
recession anticipates an audience 
preference for the big and the conser­
vative? Do we need more Shakespeare 
anyway? And if we do need the Bard, 
then in what style should he be
played...Ozzified, poetic, highly inter­
preted, or what?
To begin, some personal bias. It is hard 
to imagine too much Shakespeare in 
an English-speaking country. It is not, 
I believe, a sign of cringe to delve into 
plays which offer a wealth of inter­
pretation suitable for any time or 
place. Of course, we need to tell our 
own stories too. But it's significant 
that one of the most memorable suc­
cesses of the Adelaide Lighthouse 
Company's two-year existence was 
Neil Armfield's localised, beach-side 
Twelfth Night. Perth's revitalised Swy 
Company plans a Broome-based 
multi-racial production of the same 
play later this year. And feeding the 
Bard into such local works as Michael 
Gow's Away and David Malouf's
Blood Relations adds a dimension to 
them, though it relies on a familiarity 
with the original, which can only 
come from a greater exposure to the 
original than is offered at present.
Not that John Bell is seeking to emu­
late either the Royal Shakespeare 
Company—with which he acted 
under Peter Hall in the 60s—or the 
English Shakespeare Company—cur­
rently touring—in imposing strong 
interpretations on his chosen texts. 
Not for him a Romanian setting for 
Coriolanus or a magical garden for The 
Dream. It’s almost as though he wants 
to take us back to basics in Australian 
relations with Shakespeare. "Our aim 
is to rediscover the shock value and 
direct earthy colloquy which the 
original productions had with the 
audience", he states in his outline for 
the BSC.
This outline played a major part in 
establishing the company. It brought 
him in itially  together with 
businessman Tony Gilbert who'd 
been seeking ways of boosting 
Shakespeare in Australia and who
□
ALR : MARCH 1991
38 MATTERS ARISING
was linked to Bell by the Elizabethan 
Theatre Trust which now manages the 
company. It went on to win the finan­
cial support of an amazing 65 in­
dividual donors who, in the 
characteristic American style of sup­
porting the arts, have given half of the 
necessary money to a project the only 
re turn for which will be the warm feel­
ing of cultural contribution. It also 
wooed the more hard-nosed sponsor­
ship of Nat west Australia BanK (seek­
ing to link itself to British quality) and 
Daikyo Australia (which may be said 
to have image problems in 
Queensland, where it is the largest 
Japanese investor in the leisure in­
dustry, and is facing investigations by 
the Foreign Investment Review Board 
and the Trade Practices Commission). 
Finally, the outline won the im­
primatur of the Shakespeare Globe 
Centre in Australia,
It took John Bell and the Trust just six 
months to set it all up. Bell himself has
enormous personal standing— he 
chose the perfect moment to return 
from the English stage and found the 
famous Nimrod Company. This was 
Sydney's stake in the Australian 
theatre revolution of the early 70s, of­
fering local works in a variety of 
popular styles and lively versions of 
the classics, including Shakespeare. 
Since Nimrod folded Bell has main­
tained his reputation as the actor most 
likely to make sense of great parts 
from Cyrano to Arturo Ui to Prospero.
The Trust is now doing what it was set 
up to do 30 years ago—before it was 
waylaid into over-optim istic 
entrepreneurial ventures like Sugar 
Babies and Lennon. In the same way 
that it brought business expertise to 
the nascent Australian Opera, Ballet 
and various orchestras before launch­
ing them as established entities, it has 
used its political, social and business 
contacts to bring the BSC to life. 
"We're pretty battle hardened," says
Trust director and BSC Chairman, 
Adam Salzer, "aggressively cheese­
paring in administration and able to 
call on a network of deeply caring, 
influential people. John, who's 
fabulous at raising money, was able to 
bring in the Labor lawvers like Wran, 
Whitlamand Horler, who are part and 
parcel of his background.
"But it's hard work...lunching and 
dining for weeks on end. The US way 
of fund-raising is so cold...it's hard not 
to cheapen a product, especially in a 
buyers' market.
"But we knew we couldn't ask any 
government for half a million dollars 
without depriving other arts bodies. 
Government, anyway, gives too little 
and expects too much...But, having 
got an unsubsidised company, we're 
marketing it differently too - aiming to 
get two thirds of the audience from 
'events-based' shows like Aida and 
Carmen, the arena operas."
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Is this the way John Bell really wanted 
it? Playing on a raised circular stage in 
the centre of a hot tent with lousy 
lightlines and no scenery to a couple 
of rows of punters paying $45 to sub­
sidise the rest at $29, and kids ex­
pected to stump up $19? Can this be 
the ‘widespread and unconventional 
audience" that he set out to find in his 
outline—and can this audience be 
found anyway by a company which 
also has to be a business?
The BSC will certainly have to raise 
more money in the future to subsidise 
seats on the small town and western 
suburbs visits it plans; and, more im­
portantly, to find the million dollars 
needed for the demountable Globe- 
style theatre which has always been 
an essential part of Bell's dream for 
icmeving the intimacy and touring 
capacity needed to present 
Shakespeare in his chosen style.
And what of the first two produc­
tions—Hamlet and The Merchant of 
Vaiicel It has to be said right away that 
they were personal triumphs for John 
BelL.if all his actors came anywhere 
near matching his Shylock, then he'd 
be home and hosed. And in his direc­
tion of Hamlet, I believe he has laid 
down the pattern for his overall goal 
of the 'theatre of thought-out words". 
Hamlet is a detective story in which a
teenage Hamlet struggles to find his 
way through the complexities of 
human relations and the mysteries of 
politics. Actor John Poison is rarely 
beautiful; he's acne and whole­
hearted, suffering with his character, 
and only lapsing occasionally in that 
huge part from thinking his way 
through lines that so often are merely 
spouted.
Apart from Bell's Shylock, the attempt 
in the Merchant at simple story-telling 
had just enough interpretive graftings 
by director Carol Woodrow to reveal 
the flaws in the play without sweep­
ing me along with the plot What is the 
"love" between Antonio (the mer­
chant) and Bassanio; and why is the 
latter described as a "soldier and a 
scholar", yet dresses like a pop star 
and acts like a gigolo? And why does 
Susan Lyons's delightful, intelligent 
Portia fall for him and put herself 
completely in his charge? And what 
was the Jew's daughter, Jessica, saying 
about her feelings of guilt over her 
father's flesh-craving behaviour or at 
having deserted him by wearing a be­
wildering series of lycra cycling out­
fits?
Shylock is just so watchable that the 
others hardly need to be on stage. 
From his entrance, eased by Hatton 
Garden Jewish jokes, through the
episodes of Christian intolerance em­
phasised by the loss of Jessica (and his 
ducats) to a gentile, to the opening of 
the court case, one follows him with 
inexorable logic. And then - shades of 
Saddam Hussein • when one expects 
him to pull back, he calmly produces 
a knife, a whetstone and the scales to 
weigh Antonio's pound of flesh, and 
one realises that behind those myopic 
glasses there is a man one doesn't un­
derstand. And as he sidles crablike 
and broken offstage between pillars of 
Christian hatred, one is incapable of 
weighing him on the normal scales of 
justice - as one is incapable of judging 
so much of the morality in this play. 
Perhaps that's what Shakespeare in­
tended - and perhaps that justifies the 
Bell Shakespeare Company's con­
tinued existence?
* * *
The Bell Shakespeare Company visits 
Melbourne's Athenaeum Theatre (the 
city's impoverished condition did not 
encourage the full tented version) 
from 6 March, and Brisbane—in the 
tent on the riverbankby QPAC—from
3 April. Every capital is promised a 
visit during the first three seasons. 
Negotiations are already in train with 
Japan for a tour in 1992.
JEREMY ECCLES is a Sydney film and 
theatre critic.
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Rude Awakenings
Almost alone among the chief intellectuals of 
the old GDR, Heiner Muller refused to accept 
the ruling myths. Paul H ockenos spoke to 
him in his Berlin flat.
990 was a rough year tio n ed  as one o f the on ly  
for intellectuals in the mediums for social critique and 
now-defunct German protest.
Democratic Republic During the fleeting days of last
(GDR). However curbed under autumn, the population and its artists
the dictatorship, culture func- appeared united on the streets of Leip-
The striptease o f  humanism lays bare the bloody roots o f  culture. 
—Heiner Muller.
zig and East Berlin. But the hopes of 
the country's foremost intellectuals 
were quickly dashed. The outpouring 
of resentment against society's 
privileged elite shocked the painters 
and authors, directors and poets. They 
retreated to their desks, ideals shat­
tered.
Even for arch-sceptic Heiner Mullet 
known as the GDR's Beckett for his 
grim, apocalyptic plays, the depth of 
embitterment proved a rude awaken* 
ing. A notorious outsider, the 
playwright stayed mostly on the 
sidelines while the Christa Wolfes and 
Barbel Bohleys petitioned their 
visions of a new society. But when the 
most celebrated dramatist-director 
since Bertolt Brecht made his ap­
pearance on the revolution's stage, he 
fared no better than the rest. Before he 
had stumbled through a text prepared 
for him by the Initiative for Inde­
pendent Trade Unions at a November 
rally, the crowd booed him.
Muller's reticent political debut was 
as out of character as it was ill-timed. 
Although loose and congenial in the 
confines of his East Berlin flat, the 61- 
year-old writer is obviously uneasy 
with the crowds of critics and fans that 
now swamp him in theatre lobbies. In 
his output of plays, poems and essays 
over three decades, the tragedy of cul­
tural elitism  and revolutionary 
utopias have been dominant themes. 
In press interviews, the often caustic 
Muller has come down hard on the 
naivety of the Wolfes and Bohleys.
'One aspect of State policy was to 
drive a wedge of privilege between 
the intellectuals and the population,* 
Muller explains in his raspy voice. 
"You may travel, the other may not. 
The privileged cannot speak for the 
u nder-privileged,"
Last autumn, the people who had 
been silenced for 40 years finally had 
the chance to speak for themselves. As 
usual, he argues, the intellectuals tried 
to formulate goals too early in the 
name of the people. "They always 
want to build something, when first 
the masses must tear it down," he 
adds.
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On the 14th floor of a uniform cement 
tower block, the author's flat looks 
hardly like the abode of privilege. 
Toppieu stacks of books and aging 
newspapers lie scattered across the 
yellow-brown lino floor. Muller grins. 
He lights another 8-inch cigar. An 
open bottle of scotch sits on the 
kitchen table. He locates his guest a 
dean glass. In his standard attire of a 
black T-shirt, jeans and polyester jack­
et, he reflects on his own complex 
relationship with the GDR As the son 
of a textile worker imprisoned in 1933 
for his work with the Social 
Democrats, the young Muller first saw 
the socialist state through the eyes of 
his anti-fascist upbringing. "I was 
raised in one dictatorship and then 
came the anti-dictatorship," he says. 
*11 was the liberation from 'the other', 
but I couldn't identify with that sys­
tem either."
After a short stint as a journalist for the 
weekly Sonutag and New German 
Literature journal, he concentrated on 
his creative work from the early 1950s. 
The 27-year-old writer's first plays 
reflect his own internal struggle over 
the goals and the realities of the new 
state. As his tone became more 
abrasive, his works were banned for 
their "perspectiveless defeatism'. In 
1961, he was finally expelled from the 
Writers Union. Four years later, his 
wife and co-worker, the poet Inge 
Mfiller, committed suicide.
Even during the hardest years of 
stalinisni and neo-stalinism, intellec­
tuals like Muller enjoyed a modicum 
of freedom to write and produce. 
Then, as now, the dramatist drew 
heavily on the classics and, above all, 
upon Shakespeare. It was impossible 
to write a piece directly about 
stalinism in the early 60s, he explains 
above the city din. "One needed these 
models when one really wanted to 
pose questions." In this way, theatre 
nad an immediate, vital function in 
the GDR. Pieces may have been cen­
sored or banned, but when one finally 
got two or three hours of stage time, it 
was free. It was sim ilar in 
Shakespeare's day, he contends, with 
the monarchy and the proletariat: 
"For the proletariat theatre was ac­
tually the first attempt at democracy."
Yet for Muller, the relationship be­
tween theatre and democracy, be­
tween politics and culture, is far from
clear cut. "The problem with theatre is 
that it is allowed everything and can 
do nothing," he grins again. Smack in 
the middle of the heated debate over 
the role of art and the artist in the new 
Germany, the maverick finds himself 
still at odds with the establishment. 
The playwright scorns the idea that 
'high culture' or the fashionable con­
cept of a German Kultumation can 
somehow prevent a relapse into the 
political atrocities of the past. In fact, 
he maintains, high culture itself is 
deeply complicit in the legacy of 
modern barbarism. "As long as 
freedom is grounded on violence and 
art on privilege," he argues, "art 
works will have the tendency to serve 
as prisons, the masterpieces themsel­
ves complicit with the ruling power.'
The 80s brought Muller from relative 
obscurity to the forefront of European 
theatre. Since the wall's removal, his 
pieces are the most played in Ger­
many, running to overflow crowds 
from Freiburg to Rostock. Muller's 
subject seems an unlikely one for box 
office records: his problematic is his­
tory, above all German history. The 
condition of the Deutsche Misere and 
the continuity of tragedy and violence 
in history thread their way as com­
mon themes through every play. His 
works deconstruct the modern condi­
tion, exposing the conscious and un­
conscious structures that have 
perpetuated themselves from 
medieval Prussia to the newly united 
Germany. Like an archaeologist, the 
director-writer unearths layer after 
layer of ossified lies and silence. At the 
bottom, the structures of modern 
socialism, as well as those of post-in­
dustrial capitalism, rest on the same 
foundations that justified Auschwitz 
and Bergen Belsen.
From his earliest pieces, Muller's 
work has been a polemic with the 
master of socialist drama himself, 
Brecht. In the 1956 play The Wage 
Squeezer, he juxtaposes the new-found 
'socialist consciousness' of the party- 
true worker in the late 40s to the resis­
tance he meets from his former Nazi 
colleagues. The piece, done roughly in 
the style of Brecht's didactic meatre, 
won him the stage's highest prizes in 
the GDR. But the regime soon soured 
*on the playwright's increasingly bleak 
evaluation of the East German state. 
His art's form moved steadily away
from the Brechtian model, becoming 
ever more surreal, obtuse, frag­
mented.
While his focus shifted from the build­
ing of German socialism to the larger 
dilemmas of contemporary Europe, 
the German questions have always 
served as Muller's reference point. 
'There never was a Zero Hour and 
there never will be," comments Muller 
from behind his thick, black-framed 
glasses. The West German politicians 
are peddling the fiction that the 'post­
war' chapter of their history has final­
ly come to an end. 'Politics survives 
on dispossession and forgetting,* he 
elaborates. 'The Federal Republic is 
simply using the 40 years of the GDR 
to bury the 12 of the Nazi era. But 
Auschwitz existed and will always 
exist—whether the Germans want to 
forget it or not.'
Muller's views on politics and culture 
must be difficult to reconcile with his 
new position as president of the still- 
East Berlin Academy of Arts. For 
decades compromised with the cul­
tural policies of the old regime, the 
institution looked hard for a clean 
name to put it back on its feet. *1 had 
only one argument against it: I don't 
have the slightest desire to take this 
post. And that's no argument,' ex­
plains the freshly-elected president. 
The new chief wants to convert the 
former bastion of provincialism into 
an international organisation with a 
rotating presidency occupied by a 
non-German. No less contrary to his 
decades-long themes, he hopes to cul­
tivate a 'sta te  and ideology free 
space" where innovation in all the 
parts may occur.
Muller's unlikely position is, in fact, 
the ultimate statement of his art's 
form. Neither his plays nor his politics 
offer the ready-made solutions that 
people await so eagerly from their 
public figures. Muller's dialectic of 
contradiction is an initial impulse 
toward confronting the vicious cycle 
of history. "Naturally art must dis­
turb," he argues, reflecting on the 
united Germany. "And now we must 
determine how and what it can and 
must disturb."
PAUL HOCKENOS, a regular 
contributor to ALR, l> baaed in 
Budapest
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Galloping Consumption
Health Care Choices and the 
Public Purse, Sidney Sax, Allen 
and Unwin, Sydney 1990. 
Reviewed by Gwen Gray.
The Australian health care sys­
tem, like that of many Western 
countries, has been the site of 
p itch ed  p o litic a l  b a ttle s  
throughout the 20th century. 
Time after time, conflict has 
raged between the major politi­
cal parties and between govern­
ments and a range of vested 
interests including the medical 
profession , hospital boards, 
private insurance agencies and 
private hospitals. Consumers of 
health care have not been an or­
ganised force and their input 
into policy developm ent has 
been negligible.
The fundamental point of dispute is 
the extent to which governments 
should intervene in the provision and 
financing of health services. Op­
ponents of the welfare state argue that 
health should be left primarily to the 
market, like any other commodity, 
with doctors and other producers 
retaining as much economic freedom 
as possible. Conflicts erupted in New 
South Wales (1904-1914), Tasmania 
(1914-1919) and in Queensland in the 
decades after 1915, as governments 
tried to take control of hospitals. In­
tense controversies surrounded un­
successful attempts to introduce 
national social insurance in 1928 and 
1938. The Chifley government's ef­
forts to set up a national health service 
in the 1940s contributed mightily to 
that government's downfall. More 
recently, the Whitlam and Hawke 
Labor governments have found them­
selves embroiled in serious confronta­
tions with doctors and other interest 
groups over the introduction of 
Medibank and Medicare, systems of 
national health insurance. Health 
policy, then, is an intensely controver­
sial area, with the potential to give rise 
to high political costs for interven­
tionist governments.
Clearly, these circumstances are not 
conducive to comprehensive, 
thoughtful consideration of health 
policy options. The more that issues 
are exposed to scrutiny, the more ob­
vious will be the embedded conflicts 
of interest. Controversial questions 
such as the way the health system is 
organised the way doctors are paid 
and the kinds of services that are 
produced are therefore avoided as far 
as possible. Government intervention, 
since the 1940s, has focused primarily 
on different ways of paying for an 
existing set of institutions and ser­
vices. The prior question of what sort 
of institutions and services would 
constitute a good health system has 
not been examined by mainstream 
policy-makers.
As the title suggests. Dr Sax's book 
discusses a range of policy options 
and their implications for the public 
purse, a timely contributionsince con­
trol of public spending is a high 
priority issue with the potential to 
determine the kinds of health services 
made available. Two very important 
assumptions underpin the analysis: 
first, that the structure of the health 
system will remain unchanged and, 
second, that funding levels will not be 
increased.
The first set of arguments addressed 
are those for and against the welfare 
state. Dr Sax concludes that we need 
"a synthesis of the two value sys­
tems", the one based on individualism 
and free enterprise and the other on 
collective responsibility for provision 
of certain public goods. Next, health 
status and strategies designed to over­
come health inequalities are dis­
cussed. As has been known for many 
years, there is a strong association be­
tween poor health and poverty and 
low levels of education.
Dr Sax sees the responsibility for deal­
ing with social and environmental 
hazards as falling largely outside the 
purview of health authorities. He is 
highly critical of 'the priests of the 
new public health faiths and fads' 
who argue that 'health' expenditures 
are heavily skewed towards treatment 
services for sickness rather than
towards prevention and holistic 
primary health care. 'New public 
health' advocates under-value the 
contribution of conventional medical 
services, he argues. The solutionis not 
to transfer funding from curative to 
preventive programs. Rather, a much 
more com prehensive approach 
should be adopted within the present 
structure. There should be more em­
phasis on training and education of 
nealth professionals, rigorous evalua­
tion of existing services, better 
monitoring of the environment, more 
support services especially for the 
aged and a greater research effort.
There cannot be equal access to ser­
vices, of course, unless the better off 
and wealthy are somehow prevented 
from buying services not provided 
free or at low cost by collective means. 
Such services include private hospital 
and nursing home care, non-insured 
services such as those provided by 
nurses, nutritionists, naturopaths, 
podiatrists, dentists, physio­
therapists, counsellors and so on, 
various aids and appliances and home 
help and other support services. The 
question is rather that of deciding 
upon an acceptable standard of care to 
which everyone has access. Dr Sax ar­
gues that the present system of 
universal insurance. Medicare, is 
more equitable than the private in­
surance systems of the past.
Most of the remaining chapters of the 
book deal with costs and the implica­
tions of cost control or closely related 
issues. Contrary to a common claim, 
often put forward by opponents of the 
welfare state and others opposed to 
government intervention in health, 
the provision of free services does not 
induce people to rush out and 
demand unnecessary services. In any 
case, only general practitioner ser­
vices are initiated by patients. Most 
services (specialist, radiology, pathol­
ogy, hospital admissions and so on) 
are initiated by doctors. The use of 
medical services did increase in the 
first two years of Medicare. Indeed, 
this was one of the main objectives of 
introducing the scheme. It was in­
tended that the 19% of people without 
insurance cover under the voluntary
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system should not be faced with 
financial barriers to service use. In 
recent years, where service use has 
increased, it is in the area of doctor 
initiated services, particularly high 
cost, high technology diagnostic ser-
■  vices.
Health service evaluation is an unex­
plored concept in Australia but one 
that Dr Sax recommends be given 
serious consideration. There has been 
little examination outside medical 
drcles of the kinds of services which 
ought to be provided: debate has 
focused on systems of financing the 
services which have gradually 
evolved. However, there are 
legitimate concerns about the ap- 
prooriateness and value of many ser­
vices, Dr Sax argues. Medical science, 
while effective in treating many con­
ditions, has done little to prolong life 
in recent decades and costs have in­
creased dramatically. There are large 
variations between services provided 
from area to area and from country to 
country, as well as big differences in 
per capita expenditures on health 
care. As policy-makers in Canada and 
other OECD countries have realised 
since the 1970s, high levels of spend­
ing do not necessarily result in better 
health outcomes. Dr Sax argues that 
rigorous evaluation processes and
I continuing education schemes should be instituted not only to ensure quality of care but also to ensure that 
cost containment does not result in 
'arbitrary reductions in access to care 
or in its quality'. The public, patients 
and governments want evidence of 
quality and appropriateness. The 
medical profession is challenged to 
put its house in order. The alternative 
mighi be "officious intrusion by out­
siders"'.
Within the constraints set by the 
(realistic) assumptions that present 
structures and funding levels will be 
retained at least in the medium term. 
Dr Sax's prescriptions offer the 
prospect of considerable improve­
ments in the health system. However, 
many of the problems identified by 
the new public health and women's 
health movements would remain. 
These include the impact of the fee- 
for-service system of remuneration 
and the focus of the present system on 
medical and hospital services with 
few resources devoted to primary 
health care and prevention. Structural
change would be needed to address 
these issues.
The fee-for-service system of 
remuneration promotes the produc­
tion of insured services. This is so 
whether the insurance system is a na­
tional publicly run system ora private 
system. Unless governments or in­
surance agencies are willing to extend 
the range of insured services to those 
provided by other health profes­
sionals such as physiotherapists, 
naturopaths and so on the range of 
affordable services available will 
remain very narrow. Doctors, of 
course, vehemently oppose such an 
extension.
The second undesirable aspect of fee- 
for-service is that the more patients 
doctors see, that is, the shorter time 
spent with each patient, the higher the 
income earned. Thus, the system 
works against extended consultations 
which might include counselling sell­
ing, information provision and so on.
Again, private practice on a fee-for- 
service basis leaves doctors free to 
decide where to locate practices. Such 
systems are characterised by a serious 
mal-distribution of services, par­
ticularly specialist services. Under the 
present Australian system where 
doctors, unlike their Canadian 
counterparts, are allowed to charge 
tients a fee that is higher than the 
nefit level, it is economically ad­
vantageous to practise in an area 
where people have the means to pay 
the co-payment.
The community health program intro­
duced by the Whitlam government 
was an attempt to overcome many of 
these problems. Centres employing 
teams of health professionals on a 
salaried basis were established in all 
states. Ideally, these centres would 
provide a very wide range of services, 
including primary, secondary and ter­
tiary preventive care and people 
would gradually come to participate 
in decisions affecting their health 
through a process of community 
development. Decisions about where 
to locate centres were influenced by 
the mal-distribution of services, so 
that the program was a means for 
overcoming geographic inequalities. 
As Dr Sax has argued elsewhere, the 
community health program was far 
more radical than national health in­
surance, which merely provided bet­
ter financial underpinning for the ex­
isting system. Therefore, it was bitter­
ly opposed by the medical profession.
During the Fraser period, funding 
was gradually reduced, meeting the 
budgetary objectives of that govern­
ment and gaining the approval of the 
medical profession. The Hawke 
government promised to restore fund­
ing to 1975 levels and this it did in 
1983, except that the interim increase 
in population was not allowed for. As 
under the Fraser government, fund­
ing for community health services 
was incorporated in the identified 
health grants but no conditions were 
placed on use. The Hawke govern­
ment, like its predecessor, has there­
fore chosen not to play a role in policy 
development for community health. 
Between 1983 and 1988, tight con­
straints were kept on increases in the 
identified health grants: funds were 
escalated by a formula based primari­
ly on increases in award wages which 
were, of course, lower than increases 
in the CPI.
Those who hoped that new life would 
be breathed into community health 
under a Commonwealth Labor 
government have therefore been dis­
appointed. From this perspective, the 
1980s represents a lost opportunity: 
even a modest annual increase in 
Commonwealth funds over the eight- 
year period would have resulted in a 
far wider choice of services than cur­
rently provided in private medical 
practices. A slow but steady expan­
sion of programs at the community 
level is probably the only feasible way 
to alter the focus and structure of the 
system. A head-on confrontation with 
the medical profession such as in the 
1940s when the Chifley government 
tried to introduce a salaried medical 
service would probably produce very 
little change. An incremental expan­
sion of community health services, 
however, would not only give con­
sumers a choice of providers and a 
much greater choice of services but 
would begin to orient the system 
towards health promotion, involving 
people at the local level in decisions 
which affect their health and the 
health of their environments.
Advocates of the new public health 
and other critics of present arrange­
ments charge that the term 'health 
system' is a euphemism. The system 
is so heavily geared towards the
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provision of medical and hospital ser­
vices that it is, in fact, a 'sickness 
system'. The distribution of health ex­
penditures is cited as evidence of dis­
tortion. In 1986-87, hospitals, nursing 
homes, medical services and drugs 
consumed 79% of the total health 
budget. Only 4% was spent on com­
munity health services, health promo­
tion and illness prevention combined. 
The focus of the system on high tech­
nology diagnosis and treatment, the 
power of vested interests and the pres­
sures to introduce even more new 
technologies means that in the ab­
sence of increased funding and con­
certed efforts by policy-makers the 
present distribution of services will 
remain.
Under these circumstances, com­
prehensive health care will not be 
available at the community level. 
Groups such as Aborigines, people of 
non-English speaking background 
and women will probably continue to 
see services as inappropriate to their 
needs. The setting of health targets is 
likely to be a token effort and 
strategies to improve the health out­
comes of the population will be 
funded on a shoestring. The concerns 
of more radical reformers who take a 
'social' view of health are unlikely to 
figure prominently on the political 
agenda. In this view, health promo­
tion is a process through which people 
themselves develop the capacity to 
shape their environment, thereby ena­
bling them gradually to gain control 
over factors which determine health. 
Unlike Dr Sax, these people believe 
that social and environmental hazards
should be addressed within the health 
system as well as in other sectors.
One noticeable omission from the 
book is all but the briefest mention of 
the women's health movement. This 
movement, which began in the late 
1960s, has had some success in recent 
years in having its concerns heeded by 
Australian policy-makers, although 
funding for initiative^ is still mini­
scule. Like the new public health 
movement, the women's health 
movement represents a challenge to 
the dominant system of curative 
medical care and there is considerable 
congruence in objectives. The basic 
aim of the women's health movement 
is to create a situation where women 
are empowered to take increasing 
control over aspects of their lives 
which influence health. Women in the 
movement want information on 
which to base their own decisions 
about health, access to community 
ba sed services run by women and par­
ticipation in decision-making at all 
levels of the health system. Efforts are 
also made to sensitise “mainstream* 
services to the needs and perspectives 
of women. While the movement can­
not be said to have changed the shape 
of the health system, its influence is 
growing steadily and analyses which 
ignore its existence are seriously in­
complete.
The Australian health care system has 
not been reviewed comprehensively 
since the 1940s. Rather than develop­
ing in a context of planned objectives, 
it has grown like Topsy, the result of a 
mix of decisions and compromises by
individual doctors, professional 
bodies, hospitals and governments.
The National Health Strategy, set up 
recently to review the system over the 
next two years, thus provides an op­
portunity to evaluate current arrange­
ments and to examine the trenchant 
critiques that have been levelled at the 
system. The review's terms of refer­
ence are wide, covering issues such as 
cost containment, demand for ser­
vices, quality, access, the role of the 1 
private sector, community services, j 
preventive services and financial and 
organisational arrangements. Such a 
wide ranging inquiry should produce 
information of value to policy makers 
in the 1990s.
Knowing what might produce a better 
health service, however, does not over­
come the political obstacles to action. 
Powerful vested interests will fight 
policies that are not in their interests, 
and treasuries and finance departments 
will resist proposals that increase 
spending. As Dr Sax notes, "radical 
change is rare" in the health system. It 
is to be hoped, however, that such in­
cremental changes as are introduced in 
future will be informed by a better un­
derstanding of what constitutes health 
and a health care system and that the 
criticisms of those who want the system 
oriented towards comprehensive 
primary health, the needs of groups 
such as women, and the achievement of 
health goals will be heard and 
respected.
GWEN GRAY teaches In political 
science at the Australian National 
University.
The WPO Bytes Back
Bad Attitude: The Processed  
World Anthology, edited by Chris 
Carlsson. Verso $29.95. Reviewed 
by McKenzie Wark.
Processed World is a wonderful 
little magazine, available most­
ly from anarchist bookshops. It 
com bines s to ries , g rap h ics, 
humour, satire, with an eclectic
blend of far-left thinking. It is, 
for the most part, written by and 
for office workers. In a nutshell 
it tries to be a forum in which a 
Left culture might emerge— one 
of, for and from the white collar 
working class.
There is not much heavy rhetoric or 
jargon in Processed World. It is not a 
magazine given much to preaching a
party line. There are many first-hand 
accounts of office life and political 
struggles in the workplace. There are 
stories which are amusing and with 
which anyone who has worked in 
similar circumstances can identify. 
There are other 6tories from which one 
can learn. This anthology is both 
entertaining and useful.
If a justification is required for the 
heavy emphasis on gags, comics and
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witty slogans in Processed World and in 
this fine anthology, it lies in the fact 
(hat many office workers are cut off 
from earlier forms of working-class
■ culture and the resources for resis­
tance and leverage they provided.The 
transformation of the American 
economy from one which employed 
people mostly in agriculture and 
manufacturing to one employing 
people in services and paperwork, 
while not as complete or inevitable as 
theorists of the 'high-tech path' make 
out, is nevertheless a fact of life. Some­
thing similar has happened to work­
ing life in Australia, too.
Givpn this transformation, cultivating 
working-class culture in these new 
pockets of employment is as impor­
tant as trying to organise them in­
dustrially or politically. Perhaps in the 
long run more important. No union 
will ever last long as a genuine expres­
sion of working class interests and 
aspiration if it is not organically con­
nected to its membership by cultural
mores, practices, beliefs and attitudes. 
The criticisms Processed World makes 
of American unions on this score 
sound chillingly familiar.
The kind of culture which tends to 
coagulate around the loose editorial 
practices of Processed World is not 
without its faults. Its anarchic glee at 
childish pranks and petty sabotage is 
perhaps an understandable out­
growth of the alienated experience of 
temporary workers who have no need 
to get along with any particular com­
pany and no stake in the productivity 
of the firm which a full-time worker 
might feel. Processed World is not able 
to make the conceptual separation be­
tween power within the work process 
and the power to stop the work 
process.
They are right, nevertheless, to ques­
tion the sacrifice of any and every 
human value to productivity, to the 
endless production of more and more 
bits and bobs of a processed world. On
the positive side, their critique ex­
tends out from pointless work to the 
pointless things pointless work 
produces: toxic food, cancerous sub­
urbs and the endless search for the 
perfect weapon.
Not all of the rich mix of Californian 
alternative culture in Processed World 
translates into Australian terms, but 
there is a lot to learn from here. This 
magazine is really a very thoughtful 
experim ent in alternative com­
munication.
Every trade union and community 
group publication should have a copy 
of this book. There are plenty of car­
toons and graphics which could be 
reused. At $29.95 it's expensive but 
pretty good value, so get your local 
library to order it for you. It is the sort 
of thing that should be treated as a 
community resource.
McKENZIE WARK teaches in 
computing at Macquarie University.
Judy H oracek
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LINE
Dear M M  of Q
1 went off for an evening hair ap­
pointment leaving MM tocookhis 
own dinner. I returned and asked 
MM how he had got on with his 
culinary adventure. MM ex­
plained that he had grilled his 
steak and then decided to add 
satay sauce. But to his dismay the 
dinner tasted very strange. It was 
only then that he realised he had 
spread the steak with apricot jam.
L.oma, Q.
(N?tv Idea Mere Male Column, 
15.9.90.)
Lorna of Q (Queenstown? Quean- 
beyan ?) it is time to do something 
about this MM (misogynist moron? 
machiavellian manta-ray?). He is 
obviously doing it on purpose to 
keep you from the wild pleasures 
of Doreen's Salon de Cutt.
Explain to this MM that until he 
cooks you something nice at least 
three times a week, you will not do 
the same for him. Leave recipes for 
sweet and sour dishes around the 
house, such as that below, and see 
if he can't improve on the Cottees 
special.
I was recently discussing gender 
and housework with a friend who 
has been involved in the union 
movement for many years and who
believes that very little has changed 
over the years in terms of who does 
the cooking. She sees secretaries half 
her age in union offices scu rryi ng off 
to get hubby's tea, even if hubDy is 
already off work by the time they 
leave work
1 am not so sure that nothing has 
changed although even(!) among 
supposedly progressive people it is 
generally women who do the less 
highly regarded work. Not the oc­
casional 'whiz-bang wait til the 
friends come around for a dinner 
party and make a chocolate 
cheesecake' type meal but the 
everyday boring stuff of checking 
what is in the fridge, restocking it 
and making something atter work 
Who soaks the beans, in other
There are statistics to show that 
spending on fast food (and indeed 
ail 'out of home' food, including res­
taurants) has more or less doubled 
over the last few years, at the very 
time that women's participation in 
the paid workforce has increased 
dramatically. Does this mean that 
the huge part-time wages of women 
are being converted into Kentucky 
fried or MacFeasts, rather than 
hubby doing more around the 
home?
Whileon this lineof thought, I know 
of at least one avowedly left wing 
collective where the women do the 
bulk of cooking for functions and 
are not reimbursed for ingredients, 
but where the alcohol is arranged by 
the blokes and they are reimbursed. 
Shame, collective, shame. That said, 
let me hastily proceed to the recipe 
which is dedicated to MM of Q, who 
has perfected the art of the inventive 
protest, if not the art of the kitchen.
Chicken and Cashews 
Sweet and Sour
1 use free-range chickens. They ac­
tually have muscles due to such un­
necessary acts as flapping of wings 
and walking, and the flesh doesn't 
slop away trom the bones like ice­
cream from a stick on a hot day. I 
recently had wonderful cashews 
from Mozambique, courtesy CAA 
mail order, although I'm sure that 
the plucky Aussie cashew would do 
fine.
Take le chook and cut into smallish 
serving sized pieces (eg, each leg 
into two pieces). Heat oil in a pan 
and throw in the poulet. The oil 
should be quite hot. Let the fowl 
brown all over, turning as necessary. 
When it is golden brown, pour 
about half a cup of white wine over 
the segments and let the fumes 
evaporate for about one minute. 
Pour over the following mixture:
1/2 teaspoon grated root ginger
1 to 2 cloves crushed or finely 
chopped garlic
1 large tablespoon honey
1 to 2 tablespoons vinegar
1 to 2 tablespoons soy sauce/ tamari
large half a cup orange juice
juice of small lemon or lime
a tiny sprinkling of powdered mace 
(optional)
Th i s will sizzle like mad. Turn down 
heat. Stir, cover pan. Cook about 20 
minutes, stirring occasionally and 
making sure it does not bum. Mix in 
a handful of cashews a few minutes 
before it's done. Serve with salad 
and rice. Serves 3 or 4. Good cold.
I think that we have merely opened 
the sticky and irresistable jampot of 
gender today, and we will return to 
it at future dates, like an army of 
Amazonian ants.
Penelope Cottier.
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Glorious Defeats
Tom Zubrycki's film  Amongst 
Equals has proved a controversial 
production, and for all the wrong 
reasons. Zubrycki has every 
reason to be dissatisfied with the 
antics of the ACTU. It is not an 
anti-union film, although one 
suspects that no one at the ACTU 
has sufficient perspective, let 
alone skill, in reading film to 
gauge this. They have behaved 
abominably in this incident.
Zubrycki excels as a filmmaker in 
gathering and editing together 
first-hand testimony from par­
ticipants in events. The stories told 
by veteran unionists about the 
depression or improving condi­
tions for railway-catering workers 
are exemplary bits of documentary 
film with a positive message on 
trade unionism.
The weakness, and it is a serious 
one. is the complete lack of analysis 
offered in the film of the union 
movement's relationship to the 
changing political and economic 
environment, not just in Australia, 
but concerning Australia's inser­
tion into Ihe world economy. One 
does not expect a film to substitute 
for a thesis, but one should expect 
more from a film of this nature than 
an exercise in labour history. The 
discourse of labour history, with its 
fetish for isolated incidents.
chronicled in sequence, has 
blinkered the vision of this film.
Labour history can offer only a par­
tial perspective on the present
Eolitical economic conjuncture, acking a grasp on the politics of the present, the film flounders in 
trying to trace a line through the 
past. In this respect the film is more, 
not less, scholastic than it need be.
There is practically nothing in the 
film on the present economic 
crisis—the one we have been suffer­
ing for the last couple of decades. 
There is no analysis of the response 
of the trade union movement to 
changing conditions in this period, 
or even an acknowledgment of the 
need to change many old practices 
in industry and in the trade union 
movement. The history of trade 
unions is the history of the working 
class. The history of the working 
class is the history of capitalism. In 
failing to grasp these connections 
fully, Zubrycki has made a conser­
vative film, not one which poses a 
radical challenge to the leadership 
of the trade union movement. One 
suspects that the ACTU's an­
noyance with it stems not from its 
biting criticisms but from its ir­
relevance to present issues.
Take, for example, the section on the 
Robe River dispute. This is 
presented ambiguously as a 'defeat' 
for the unions. But one cannot iso­
late the unions from the class which 
composes it or the economic rela­
tions which define both class and 
union. If Robe River was a setback 
for the unions, was it really a vic­
tory for capital? Did productivity 
rise or fall after Peko-Wallsend 
went in with the big stick? It fell. 
Robe River might have been a 
defeat for the unions, but the work­
ing class can still resist, silently, 
from within the capital relation. If 
anything, Robe River shows why 
the flexible, tactical bargaining ap­
proach to work practice reform 
might be preferable for the unions, 
workers and for some sections of 
capital. At other mines in the region 
where a review of work practices 
took place as a joint exercise involv­
ing the workers, the unions and 
management, it was possible to in­
crease productivity, maintain union 
authority and reform work prac­
tices. Such an approach is vital in
many areas for the survival of 
workers, unions and capital alike. 
All three have to see their situation 
in international perspective now. 
The economic conditions which 
reigned historically from Federa­
tion to the Whitlam era are gone.
In the good old days, high export 
earnings from commodities 
financed our imports. Manufactur­
ing developed behind tariff barriers 
as a substitute for imports. Wages 
were indexed through the arbitra­
tion system to a cost of living based 
on local consumer goods costs, 
regardless of world prices. When a 
local price rise led to a wage rise 
through arbitration, tariffs could be 
hitched also to protect the system 
from global price competition. This 
system was designed, following the 
depression of the last century to in­
sulate us from global price move­
ments. As such it worked 
reasonably well. It was no match for 
the debacle of the 20s and 30s 
depression which pulled the rug 
out from under our commodity ex­
port prices. Nor is it any help now 
that those prices are in long-term 
decline. This is the crisis which 
unions, workers, capital, the nation 
as a whole has to confront. This is 
the crisis on which Amongst Equals 
is curiously silent. Regardless of 
whether one supports the Accord, 
Australia Reconstructs, Simon Crean 
or none of the above, one cannot 
dodge these issues without running 
the risk of irrelevance.
Zubrycki ran that risk and made an 
irrelevant film. His eye is too firmly 
fixed on history. Not only on the 
history of the movement but on the 
place his own film might have for 
posterity, as a lasting document of 
labour history. This is why the film 
refuses to discuss the present crisis, 
and it is a pity that Zubrycki has not 
made a committed film in the sense 
of committing itself to helping 
people grasp the present crisis of 
trade unionism, which is a crisis for 
the working class itself as well as for 
capital. We need a film which deals 
with these issues now. Not a 
scholarly exercise which speaks to 
and for posterity. That will be cold 
comfort if the unions fail in the 
present crisis.
McKenzie Wark.
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DEAR DR.
HARTMAN
Sperm Wails
Hello patients,
Patients, psychic storms are cur­
rently shaking the lesbian com­
munity and the underlying cause 
can be summed up in two words— 
baby hunger!
There are signs of it everywhere. 
Separatist women who haven't 
even let a man inside their house for 
years are now running around Syd­
ney with empty Vegemite jars look­
ing for sperm donors.
These are the lucky ones. At least 
they've made the decision to try. It's 
the ambivalent girls I really worry 
about. I had a little lesbian lassie 
arrive at my Newtown clinic in 
Sydney just the other day in a 
shocking state. She was an ex­
Catholic who'd been in the clutches 
of the nuns from the cradle to Year 
12. She told me she'd now "over­
come her guilt* and "accepted her 
sexuality". You know the type, a 
real worrier.
She now lives with her girlfriend in 
a non-sexist, non-smoking, sperm- 
free zone. "But all I really want is a 
baby!" she wailed. ' I  know lots of 
women are self-inseminating these 
days,' she told me, 'but I find the 
idea a little odd.' And then she 
threw herself across my couch and 
wailed, "Doctor, what should I 
do?"
At my Carlton clinic in Melbourne 
the girls with very short hair and 
very big leather coats start queuing
up in the waiting room as soon as 
we open the doors. They've all got 
dogs waiting outside. The really 
desperate ones have started to 
dress their dogs in clothes. The 
'dog dressing' phenomenon is one 
of the advanced symptoms of the 
baby hunger syndrome.
'Dog dressing' usually begins in­
nocently enough, perhaps a simple 
scarf tied rakishly around the neck 
of a tough bull terrier. A few months 
later you se<* that same bull terrier 
at a street march or in a shopping 
centre and you notice it*s wearing a 
carefully made little waist-coat 
with a women’s symbol 
embroidered on the pocket. It all 
seems like a cute joke at this stage. 
A little eccentric but nothing to 
worry about. But when you see that 
same bull-terrier being pushed 
down the street in a set of shorty 
pyjamas, you begin to realise that 
something is tembly wrong. To the 
professional eyes of the psycho- 
sexual therapist, this is a clear case 
of baby hunger!
Patients, if you are bottle-feeding 
your poodle while you read this 
magazine, might I offer you this 
simple advice: make the decision to 
do it right now and get down im­
mediately to the all important job of 
sperm acquisition.
Now you hear a lot of stories these 
days about how "the boys don't 
like to part with their precious 
seminal fluid". I had a terribly bitter 
lass in group the other day who'd 
worked her way through univer­
sity as an usherette in a suburban 
movie theatre. She insisted that 
" the bastards squirted it all over me 
for years in the back row and now 
they w on't even give me a 
teaspoonful when I really need it”. 
I couldn't bear to see the terrible 
tightness that was developing 
around her mouth, so I had one of 
my male nurses give her what she 
wanted on the spot.
Frankly, patients, this emotionally 
scarred usherette has just been 
going to the wron£ films in later 
life. Every male witn a gold pass to 
the Sydney and Melbourne film fes­
tivals is a known donor.
Follow these simple instructions 
and soon your only problem will be 
deciding which of your friends to 
have at the birth:
1. Most importantly, get it quickly. 
Some lassies spend months of their 
lives with thermometers up their 
love canals trying to work out the 
precise moment of ovulation.
All these scientific efforts have 
often been to no a vail for one simple 
reason—they are not getting it in 
quickly enough. The little tadpoles 
get very tardy within 30 minutes. 
You want to see them out of his 
joystickand into your pouch within 
ten minutes. There's no time for 
picking it up from the bloke at his 
house and dashing across town in a 
taxi. The mother-to-be needs to 
have that chap jerking off (to use a 
medical term) in close proximity to 
her person.
E
2. Get that bloke and his jar into 
our house. Make sure you provide 
im with a range of appropriate 
literature. Remember this is no time 
for ideological purity about what 
constitutes pornography. Give the 
chap a fighting chance. After all, 
just how aroused would you feel 
left alone with a jar in a strange 
bathroom?
While he’s busy with the 
magazines, you should be in the 
kitchen preparing a light snack and 
a refreshing beverage. After all, 
even the blood bank gives its 
donors a cup of tea and an Arnott's 
assorted cream.
One final word of warning: don't be 
surprised when he comes out of the 
batnroom and sheepishly offers 
you a tiny blob. It might have felt 
like buckets down your leg in years 
gone by, but when you see it in a jar 
in the cold light of day, you'll be 
surprised how little it looks. Grab it 
and get it in—then send me a cigar.
I'll deal with the psycho-sexual im­
plications of the actual birth in a 
future consultation.
Sena your problems to Dr 
Hartman's secretary, Julie 
McCrossin, care of ALR.
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This hurts us 
more than it 
hurts you
We've tightened our belts to the last notch: the 
executive vehicles have been sold, all coffee 
breaks have been cancelled, flexitime rorts are 
at an end and there are no more cigarettes on 
com pany time.
We have tried, dear reader, but rising costs of 
production have forced us to increase 
the cover Drice of ALR.
From next month you'll pay $4 for a copy of ALR 
and subscription rates will rise accordingly.
But you can continue to receive ALR at the old 
price if you subscribe now.
As well, all subscriptions received before 31st 
March are in the draw for $300 worth of records 
from Larrikin Records and $300 worth of books 
from Melbourne's International Bookshop.
TO SUBSCRIBE You'll need to  tell us the  subscriber's NAME and  ADDRESS. II you 're  giving a 
gift subscription to  a  friena. please include YOUR OWN. as both  givers and  recipients will 
be  Included in the draw.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES (until 31st M arch) For one  year (11 issues): S25 individuals; S23 
concession; $35 institutions. For tw o years: $44 indiviauals; $40 concession; $60 Institutions. 
PAYMENT Please enclose paym ent by cheque , m oney order or cred it card . C redit ca rd  
paym ents need to Include HOLDER'S NAME. NUMBER and EXPIRY DATE.
POST TO ALR Subscriptions, Freepost 28, Box A247, Sydney South, NSW 2000
COMPETITION PERMIT NUMBERS; Northern Territory NT 1313/90, ACT TP 90/1532, NSW TC 
90/3806, V ictoria  90/2568
NEW FROM 
WILLIAM HEINEMAN AUSTRALIA-
INEQUALITY IN AUSTRALIA
Slicing the Cake
The Social Justice Collective
Analysing llie growing inequalities in Australian society, this 
important book offers a deeper insight into the reasons they 
persist and in some areas intensify. Indispensible for those who 
want to interpret the complexities that shape Australia in the 
1990s and play a part in developing alternatives. RRP S 19.95 pb
A MAP OF DAYS
L ife on the Left
Denis Freney
Freney's revolutionary odyssey sees him roaming the world 
from South Africa in ]®61 to Algeria in 1965, then returning to 
Australia to help organise Vietnam war protests, demonstrations 
against aparfheifi, campaigns for Aborignal rights and gay 
liberation, and support for East Timor. A Map o f  Days not only 
charts the course of a turbulent life on the Left but paints a rich 
and vivid canvas of our times. RRP $24.95 pb
Available from all eood bookshops or mail the coupon below with 
a cheque for the recommended retail price to The Left Book Club, 
Box 22, Trades Hall, 4 Goulburn Street, Sydney, NSW 2000. 
Books ordered will be delivered free o f  charge.
N A M E ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ADDRESS
PO ST C O D E
Q t y _____  INEQUALITY IN AUSTR LIA @  *19 .95
Q t y _____  A MAP O F DAYS @  $24.95 % TOTAL PAYABLE: i
